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ABSTRACT 
Historically, bank regulators have restricted bank dividends as part of a 
larger effort to preserve banks’ capital and make them more able to withstand 
losses.  In today’s dynamic banking markets, the formulaic and rigid ways by 
which regulators have traditionally policed dividends have become 
anachronistic.  Against this background, the Federal Reserve Board has 
attempted to update and reinvigorate dividend regulation through two 
regulatory reforms: (1) the Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review 
(CCAR) program and (2) the Dodd-Frank Act Stress Test program. 
This Article will explore the important practical and theoretical 
implications that result from these regulatory reforms.  As a practical matter, the 
ability of banks to make distributions—the most basic method by which equity 
investors obtain returns on their capital investment—has been made contingent 
and contestable to an unprecedented degree.  For example, over the past two years 
the Federal Reserve Board has required Bank of America, Citigroup, and 
Goldman Sachs to adjust their dividend plans.  In a privatized system of 
banking, restrictions on the ability of stock investors to obtain returns potentially 
complicate bank funding. 
As for regulatory theory, these reforms are noteworthy because they unite, 
for the first time, what had previously been two separate sub-systems of the bank 
regulatory framework: the formal-mandatory dimension of bank regulation, 
exemplified by the formulaic, automatic application of traditional dividend 
restrictions, and the informal-discretionary dimension of bank regulation, 
exemplified by the context-specific regulation of “unsafe and unsound practices” 
and stress testing.  These reforms provide further evidence of a broader trend in 
financial regulation towards greater emphasis on hypothetical and conjectural 
future stress scenarios.  Finally, this Article links the CCAR program to the 
existing “risk regulation” literature that has developed in the environmental, 
health, and safety regulatory arenas.  Although the risk regulation model has 
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not yet taken hold in financial regulatory scholarship, the CCAR program 
provides a clear example of its relevance to the regulatory tasks of bank 
supervisors.  By viewing the program through the risk regulatory lens, the Article 
frames future research questions concerning the utility of applying the risk 
regulatory model to risk-taking financial institutions. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Since the Civil War era, banking law in the United States has 
restricted the ability of banks to pay dividends and make other 
distributions of corporate property.  The premise of dividend 
regulation is that by limiting transfers of assets from banks and their 
holding companies to their stockholders, bank regulators increase the 
pool of capital that is available to absorb unexpected losses, thereby 
making banks more resilient.  More resilient banks, in turn, result in 
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reduced demands on federal deposit insurance and other government 
safety nets as well as a more stable financial system.  Dividend 
regulation figured prominently in all banking legislation from the late 
nineteenth century through the New Deal era.  In the decades that 
followed the New Deal, Congress introduced new bank regulatory 
systems—such as the policing of “unsafe and unsound practices” and 
the “prompt corrective action” regime—that also provided for 
dividend restrictions, though as part of much broader regulatory 
reforms. 
In recent decades, however, traditional dividend restrictions have 
become anachronisms because the ways in which they were used have 
proven too rigid and formulaic for a banking industry that has 
undergone rapid change as a result of deregulation, increased 
competition, and technological developments.1  In explaining the 
irrelevance of traditional dividend regulation, other commentators 
focus less on its shortcoming as a regulatory technology, and more on 
regulatory capture, which critiques the ways in which regulators 
implement those regulatory technologies.  Specifically, these 
commentators argue that supervisors treat banks with a light touch in 
order to curry favor with them for future employment, or on account 
of a vaguer, but potentially more pernicious, form of “cultural” or 
“social” capture that impedes their ability to perform their statutory 
mandates in the public interest.2 
 
 1  See MARTIN WOLF, THE SHIFTS AND THE SHOCKS: WHAT WE’VE LEARNED—AND 
HAVE STILL TO LEARN—FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 117–48 (2014) (arguing that the 
financial system has become more unstable on account of liberalization, globalization, 
innovation, leverage, and perverse incentives); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The 
Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation 
and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215 (providing magisterial history of the 
wrenching changes in the financial services sector from 1975 to 2000). 
 2  See ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: WHAT’S 
WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 203–07 (2013) (discussing regulatory 
capture problem in the banking industry more generally); IAN AYRES & JOHN 
BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 80, 
90 (1992) (attributing regulatory capture in part to a desire for a “smoothly running 
work life” and a distaste for confrontation); James Kwak, Cultural Capital and the 
Financial Crisis, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND 
HOW TO LIMIT IT 71 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss, eds. 2014) (discussing 
“cultural capture”); Willem H. Buiter, Central Banks and Financial Crises, in MAINTAINING 
STABILITY IN A CHANGING FINANCIAL SYSTEM 495, 601 (2009), available at 
https://www.kansascityfed.org/~/media/files/publicat/ 
sympos/2008/buiter031209.pdf?la=en (using the term “cognitive regulatory capture” 
to describe phenomenon by which regulators “internali[ze], as if by osmosis, the 
objectives, interests and perception of reality of the vested interest they are meant to 
regulate and supervise in the public interest”); Robert F. Weber, Structural Regulation 
as Antidote to Complexity Capture, 49 AM. J. BUS. L. 643, 649–56 (2012) (theorizing 
“complexity capture” as a “soft, hegemonic [form of regulatory] capture” in the 
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Whatever its cause, the regulatory track record is incontrovertible: 
in the lead up to the recent financial crisis, bank supervisors did not 
restrict the steady outflow of funds from banks to their stockholders.  
As weak signals of impending catastrophe piled up,3 regulators blithely 
looked the other way as their supervised institutions became ever more 
thinly capitalized.  Incredibly, bank dividends increased steadily every 
quarter from 2005 through 2007, and remained high throughout 
2008—including late 2008, during which “the most unbelievable week 
in America ever”4 brought the financial system to its knees.5 
The failure of banking law and regulation to stanch the 
hemorrhaging of bank capital is a historical fact.  Dividend regulation 
did not prevent or soften the impact of this most recent financial crisis.  
But the regulation of dividends, if it can be implemented in an 
effective manner, remains a useful tool, at least in theory, on account 
of its simplicity.  By restricting the ability of banks and their holding 
companies to transfer capital to stockholders, dividend restrictions 
ensure that there is greater loss-absorbing capital within the enterprise.  
Better capitalized banks are more stable and resilient banks, and 
dividend regulation can contribute to that result.6 
This Article explains how the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System (the “Federal Reserve Board,” or “FRB”), the regulator 
for banks at the holding company level, has recently attempted to 
 
context of authentically complex regulated markets that affects “even virtuous, public-
regarding regulators who are resistant to traditional capture efforts by industry”); 
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps Giving in to Wall 
Street, 81 U. CIN. L.REV. 1283 (2013) (discussing regulatory capture problem in the 
banking industry more generally); Steven M. Davidoff, The Government’s Elite and 
Regulatory Capture, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2010), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/ 
06/11/the-governments-elite-and-regulatory-capture (describing “social capture”). 
 3  See, e.g., ALAN S. BLINDER, AFTER THE MUSIC STOPPED: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, THE 
RESPONSE, AND THE WORK AHEAD 34, 36 figs.2.2 & 2.3 (2013) (registering decline in 
housing prices and housing starts in first quarter of 2006); id. at 90 (chronicling 
liquidity crisis at BNP Paribas subprime mortgage money market funds on account of 
evaporation of liquidity in that market).  
 4  ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL STREET 
AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM—AND THEMSELVES 2 (2010) 
(quoting JPMorgan Chase & Co. CEO Jamie Dimon during a morning meeting with 
his management team after consulting with government officials about the impending 
bankruptcy filing of Lehman Brothers and bailout of American International Group 
Inc., or “AIG”). 
 5  See Beverly Hirtle, Bank Holding Company Dividends and Repurchases During the 
Financial Crisis, N.Y. FED. RESERVE BANK STAFF REPORT NO. 666, at 22 fig.1 (2014), 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr666.pdf (showing dividends 
paid by large bank holding companies from 20052009). 
 6  See Robert F. Weber, Post-Crisis Reforms and High Reliability Theory, 50 GA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2015) (explaining how capital adequacy regulation is designed to 
improve the resilience of supervised banks). 
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reinvigorate dividend restrictions through two new regulatory 
initiatives.7  And banks have taken notice.  JPMorgan Chase & Co., the 
largest bank holding company in the United States by assets, has 
described this new, reinvigorated dividend regulation regime as the 
“primary measure [that it] use[s] to assess [its] capital adequacy.”8  In 
the summer of 2014, the Chief Financial Officer of The Goldman 
Sachs Group Inc. told reporters it was “obvious” that these new 
programs required the bank to change its business practices—in that 
case, to scale back its profitable repurchase (or “repo”) lending 
program—in order to preserve its ability to pay dividends.9  Under the 
two new programs, the FRB has over the past four years ordered ten of 
the largest banks in the world—a group that also includes Bank of 
America, Inc., the second largest U.S. bank by assets—to cease 
payments of dividends to their stockholders,10 cutting off the principal 
means by which the stockholders expect to obtain a return on their 
capital investment.11 
The important novelty of these new regulatory initiatives is 
underscored by the fact that each of these banks in the preceding 
examples was well capitalized and in compliance with applicable 
capital adequacy rules at the time of the regulatory interventions.  The 
problem, according to regulators, was a circumstance that only five 
years earlier they would not be able to take into consideration: namely, 
that even though these banks were perfectly well capitalized at the 
time, they might run into trouble if imaginary and hypothetical adverse 
conditions in the future economy and future financial markets were to 
come to pass. 
Taken together, these two new FRB regulatory programs 
 
 7  The new dividend restrictions that are the focus of this Article apply only to the 
largest bank holding companies, known under the FRB’s new Regulation YY as 
“covered companies.”  See infra note 190–92 and accompanying text (explaining that 
a “covered company” is a bank holding company with over fifty billion dollars in total 
assets or a company designated by the Financial Stability Oversight Council as 
systemically important).  Unless otherwise noted, references to “banks” and “bank 
holding companies” should be read to refer to the term of art “covered companies” as 
set forth in Regulation YY.   
 8  JPMorgan Chase & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 117 (Feb. 28, 2013), 
available at http://investor.shareholder.com/jpmorganchase/secfiling.cfm?filing 
ID=19617-13-221 [hereinafter JPMorgan 10-K]. 
 9  See Michael J. Moore, Goldman Sachs’s Stress-Test Stumble Leads to Repo Cut, 
BLOOMBERG (July 15, 2014, 3:46 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2014-07-15/goldman-sachs-s-stress-test-stumble-leads-to-repo-cut.  
 10  See infra note 273 and accompanying text (summarizing the effects on dividend 
policy for those bank holding companies whose capital plans the FRB has rejected). 
 11  See infra note 18 (explaining the critical role of dividends for stockholder 
returns). 
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reinvigorate the traditional regulatory tool of dividend regulation by 
combining it with the relatively new regulatory tool of stress testing.  
The first of its initiatives, the Dodd-Frank Act Stress Tests (DFAST) 
program, requires banks to demonstrate their ability to withstand 
economic and financial stress as reflected in hypothetical stress 
scenarios involving adverse financial economic developments.12  The 
second initiative, the Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review 
(CCAR) program, requires a bank to submit a “capital plan” detailing 
how it expects to ensure it will possess adequate capital over the 
coming year, including any proposed plans to make dividends or other 
distributions of bank property.  If a bank is unable to demonstrate its 
financial stability under the hypothetical stress conditions and after 
giving effect to its planned capital actions, the FRB will reject the 
capital plan and restrict its ability to pay dividends or make other 
distributions.  In evaluating the bank’s financial stability, the FRB 
determines whether the bank would satisfy all regulatory capital 
standards if the bank were to effectuate its proposed distributions or 
dividends under the hypothetical and future stressed market conditions. 
These developments shift the focus from traditional capital 
regulation, under which regulators historically gauge compliance by 
determining whether a bank presently satisfies applicable regulatory 
capital standards under actual and current market conditions.  The 
regulatory lens is projected into the future on two accounts: on the one 
hand, the FRB imagines adverse future economic and financial 
conditions, and on the other hand, the FRB imagines the effects of the 
bank’s future expectations to transfer capital (through dividends and 
the like) outside of the company group. 
This shift in focus has significance not only because the FRB has 
exhumed and polished the traditional regulatory tool of dividend 
regulation for a new use.  It also unites, for the first time, what had 
previously been two separate sub-systems of the bank regulatory 
framework: the formal-mandatory dimension of bank regulation, 
exemplified by the formulaic, automatic application of traditional 
dividend restrictions and capital requirements, and the informal-
discretionary dimension of bank regulation, exemplified by the context-
specific policing of “unsafe and unsound practices” and stress tests.  
Viewing dividend regulation through these formal-mandatory and 
informal-discretionary lenses reveals a troubling state of affairs.  On 
the one hand, the formal-mandatory tools have become largely 
 
 12  On the practice and theory of stress testing as a regulatory tool, see Robert F. 
Weber, A Theory for Deliberation-Oriented Stress Testing Regulation, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2236, 
2237–44 (2014). 
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obsolete because they rely too heavily on rigid accounting metrics to 
police dynamic, flexible institutions, and they fail to consider how 
dividends might affect a bank’s financial condition in light of future 
contingencies.  On the other hand, regulators exhibit hesitancy, even 
unwillingness, to use informal-discretionary tools. 
But dividend regulation is where the FRB has created a possible 
solution to the problem.  The CCAR and DFAST programs 
reinvigorate dividend regulation, a traditional formal-mandatory 
regulatory tool, by taking into account hypothetical and conjectural 
future stress scenarios, a clearly informal-discretionary tool.13  These 
programs are both rigid and forward-looking.  They allow regulators 
to consider the effects of future hypothetical scenarios on a bank, but 
also tether those scenarios to a system of rigid numerical trigger points 
that require intervention by regulators. 
Consequently, the ability of banks to make dividends and 
distributions to their stockholders—the most basic method by which 
equity investors obtain returns on their capital investment—has been 
made contingent and contestable to an unprecedented degree.  In a 
jurisdiction relying on a privatized system of finance and banking, 
private investors are responsible for providing equity and debt capital 
to banks and other financial intermediaries.  Restrictions on their 
ability to obtain return on their investment therefore strikes at the 
heart of this privatized system.14   
Aside from its practical implications for banks and its innovations 
in regulatory techniques, the CCAR program has further implications 
for regulatory theory and practice.  It provides an opportunity to 
bridge some intramural divides separating sub-fields of administrative 
law that historically have not interacted, in the process creating new 
opportunities for learning and improved practice.  In particular, this 
Article describes how the CCAR program, and the informal-
discretionary dimension more broadly, adopts features of so-called 
“risk regulation” regimes in the environmental, health, and safety 
regulatory fields.   
 
 13  See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., COMPREHENSIVE CAPITAL 
ANALYSIS AND REVIEW 2014: ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK AND RESULTS 1 (2014), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/ccar_20140326.pdf 
[hereinafter 2014 CCAR RESULTS] (“CCAR is also designed to help both the [bank 
holding company] and the Federal Reserve evaluate whether a [bank holding 
company’s] capital accretion and distribution decisions are prudent, given inherent 
uncertainty about the future.”).  
 14  See Simon Johnson, Morgan Stanley Speaks: Against Relying on Capital Requirements, 
BASELINESCENARIO (Nov. 24, 2009), http://baselinescenario.com/2009/11/24/ 
morgan-stanley-speaks-against-relying-on-capital-requirements/. 
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Risk regulation is a slippery moniker with a range of related, but 
rarely identical, connotations.  Nevertheless, any attempt to define risk 
regulation starts with the burst of environmental, health, and safety 
regulation that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s.  The common thread 
that ties these risk regulatory regimes together is that each requires 
regulators to exercise their discretion in settings where scientific 
uncertainty is unavoidable.  The typical risk regulation regime consists 
of (1) a statutory risk trigger that permits an agency to act on the basis of 
anticipated, but uncertain, harm and (2) a statutory standard specifying 
the level or stringency with which the agency should regulate the harm 
and the factors it may consider in doing so. 
The relevance of the risk regulation literature to the informal-
discretionary dimension of bank supervision should be apparent.  In 
both settings, the regulatory task requires the regulator to determine 
whether a statutory trigger test has been met by referring to an 
assessment of the risk that a future, uncertain outcome will transpire.  
Moreover, both settings also necessitate a trade-off, guided by the 
statutory standard, between protection against risks and the costs of 
providing that protection. 
Notwithstanding the evident parallels between risk regulation and 
financial regulation and supervision, the idea that risk regulation is 
really about protecting health, safety, and the environment—and, by 
implication, not about protecting financial institutions and systems—
has proven sticky.  In a sense, this stickiness is counterintuitive.  After 
all, financial regulatory systems are set up, among other things, for the 
express purpose of regulating systemic risk and supervising the 
institutions designed to create, take, and profit from risk.  For purposes 
of this Article, the important point is to register how this particular 
corner of financial regulation resonates in perhaps unexpected ways 
with well-established traditions in other administrative law settings.  
Future research will undoubtedly advance our understanding of how 
the informal-discretionary mode of banking supervision (including the 
CCAR program and initiatives like it) fits into risk regulatory theory 
more broadly. 
This Article begins in Part II by explaining why dividends matter: 
why they matter to stockholders, who look to them to obtain a return 
on their investment, and why they matter to bank supervisors, who look 
at them as a potential threat to the solvency of the bank and the 
stability of the financial system.  Part III provides a brief history of 
regulatory restrictions on bank dividends, starting from the Civil War 
era legislation until the present day.  Part IV explains how the so-called 
“prompt corrective action” regime revolutionized bank supervision 
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and had served, since 1991 until these recent reforms, as the primary 
statutory authorization for the use of governmental power to restrict 
bank dividends.  Part V offers some theoretical observations about the 
bank supervisory system, distinguishing its formal-mandatory 
dimension from its informal-discretionary dimension, both as a 
historical matter and as a matter of regulatory technology.  This Part 
highlights in particular the open-ended, indeterminate, and 
hypothetical aspects of the informal-discretionary dimension, and 
explains why it historically contrasted sharply with the formal-
mandatory system, which consisted of rigid regulatory responses 
calibrated to precise accounting metrics.  It also explains how the 
literature on “risk regulation”—a research program that has developed 
in the environmental, safety, and health contexts, but has yet to take 
hold in the financial regulatory context—provides a useful frame 
within which to view financial regulatory programs that draw on the 
informal-discretionary dimension.  Finally, Part VI undertakes the first 
comprehensive study of how the CCAR and DFAST programs 
constitute a novel system of dividend regulation, noting how they (1) 
combine, for arguably the first time, aspects of both the formal-
mandatory and informal-discretionary dimensions of bank regulation, 
and (2) provide an example for how bank supervision has, in some 
respects, already incorporated attributes of risk regulatory theory and 
practice.  Part VII concludes. 
II. WHY DIVIDENDS MATTER IN A PRIVATIZED SYSTEM OF FINANCE 
In a privatized system of finance, for-profit companies are 
responsible for performing the key financial functions that together 
are “the oil that lubricates the wheels of commerce.”15  These private 
financial companies provide the payment systems infrastructure for 
large and small transactions, transmit monetary policy, manage risk 
through derivatives and insurance, provide information to markets, 
facilitate international trade, and transform savings (e.g., deposits) 
into investment capital (e.g., business loans).  To fund these activities, 
companies raise capital from investors.  By relying on private 
investment capital to fund these for-profit finance companies, such a 
financial system subjects the companies to the pressures and demands 
of capital markets.16  The investors that fund financial enterprises look, 
 
 15  BENJAMIN J. COHEN, IN WHOSE INTEREST?: INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND AMERICAN 
FOREIGN POLICY 299 (1986). 
 16  A privatized system of finance is not a preordained state of affairs, even in a 
largely capitalist system of economic exchange.  On the other end of the spectrum are 
state-administered banking regimes like that of China, where the state dictates lending 
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as do all equity investors, for a return on their investment.  Because the 
business of banking is conducted overwhelmingly through the 
corporate form,17 the relevant investors are stock investors, who obtain 
 
policy through the use of macroprudential regulatory tools; as lending overheats, the 
state authorities order Chinese banks to increase loss provisions and capital buffers, 
and when companies struggle to obtain finance, state authorities order banks to lend 
more.  See, e.g., China Tightening: End of the Binge, FIN. TIMES, http:// 
smartnews.cc/financial-times/BcFtCoAgDADQE-3LFrhuo-bwR1LgwOv33oj4LqK9N3 
pgeye1uWjRQYlFzO8OdtYCIp0he07ALKreS1UrOGI-Pw#.VgebmOlOTww (last visited 
Sept. 27, 2015) (reporting how China’s bank supervisor implemented Basel risk 
weighting system in a manner so as to encourage debt capital flows to small and 
medium businesses); Claire Jones, The Third Arm: Macroprudential Policy, FIN. TIMES 
(Sept. 22, 2011, 7:58 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/80e498de-de03-11e0-
a391-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3mvERwsDb (contrasting historic tendency of Asian 
governments to rely on macroprudential tools such as loan-to-value ratios to affect 
credit flows in economy with tendency of non-Asian large economies to rely solely on 
monetary and fiscal policy).  Even the United States had a formal state-administered 
home mortgage credit system in the form of the government-sponsored entities Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac before they were legally, though not economically, privatized.  
See Roger Congleton, The Political Economy of the Financial Crisis of 2008, in LESSONS FROM 
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE 23, 23 
(Robert W. Kolb, ed. 2010) [hereinafter LESSONS FROM THE CRISIS] (noting that 
Congress formed Fannie Mae in 1938 and arranged for its privatization in 1968); David 
Reiss, Privatizing Profit and Socializing Loss, in LESSONS FROM THE CRISIS, supra, 437, 437 
(writing in 2010 that “[t]he federal government has given [Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac] the mission of providing liquidity and stability to the United States residential 
mortgage market and achieving certain affordable housing goals”). 
 17  Congress has also provided authority to government agencies to charter mutual, 
non-corporate private credit institutions such as credit unions and mutual thrift banks 
(also known as mutual savings and loans institutions).  See Mehrsa Baradaran, How the 
Poor Got Cut out of Banking, 62 EMORY L.J. 483, 50019 (2013).  Total assets at U.S. credit 
unions as of June 2014 were over one trillion dollars.  See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE 
FED. RESERVE SYS., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES: FLOW OF FUNDS, BALANCE 
SHEETS, AND INTEGRATED MACROECONOMIC ACCOUNTS: FIRST QUARTER 2014 78 (2014), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/20140605/z1.pdf [hereinafter 
Q1 2014 FUNDS FLOW / BALANCE SHEETS].  While that amount is significant, it pales in 
comparison to the nearly thirteen trillion dollars of assets held by non-credit union 
depository institutions.  See id. at 76.  The thrift industry, while larger than the credit 
union industry in terms of total assets, has experienced large-scale demutualization, 
which refers to the process of conversion from a mutual ownership structure to a stock 
ownership structure.  See JAMES A. WILCOX, CREDIT UNION CONVERSIONS TO BANKS: 
FACTS, INCENTIVES, ISSUES AND REFORMS 2 (2006) (“Between 1975 and 2004, there were 
1,830 mutual-to-stock thrift conversions, and the number of mutual thrifts shrunk 
from 3,791 to 625.”).  So most of today’s thrifts are, like national banks, stock 
companies.  Furthermore, it is expected that most remaining thrifts (whether mutual 
or stock companies) will convert to national banks in the coming years to avoid the 
surviving restrictions on thrift activities in the post-Dodd-Frank Act regulatory 
environment.  See DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL, SUMMARY OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET 
REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 89 (2010), available at http:// 
fsroundtable.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/DavisPolk-Summary-of-Dodd-Frank-
Wall-Street-Reform-Act.pdf (“Although [the Dodd-Frank Act] maintains the federal 
thrift charter, it eliminates the most important advantages of the thrift charter and 
imposes new penalties for failure to comply with the qualified thrift lender (‘QTL’) 
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returns on their capital investment in the form of stock dividends.18 
The banking sector is distinctive because banks receive regulatory 
licenses to offer government-insured deposited savings and also enjoy 
access to special government safety nets unavailable to other financial 
market participants.  The banking license therefore makes the 
government the primary risk-bearer in the event a bank defaults on its 
debts.  In exchange for the privileges of the license, banks must comply 
with an extensive regulatory apparatus designed in principle to protect 
the government’s contingent liability—i.e., its promise to provide 
lender-of-last-resort facilities and its deposit guarantee.  One way of 
conceptualizing this regulatory apparatus is as a stand-in19 for the 
contractual protections that private lenders and guarantors would 
extract from the bank in a system without government safety nets, to 
forestall attempts by managers and stockholders to obtain higher 
returns by taking on levels of risk that are excessive from the vantage 
point of creditors.20  It might be objected that creditors could do this 
 
test. As a result, it is likely that most holders of a thrift charter will have a powerful 
incentive to convert it into a bank charter.”).  The FRB has reflected this expectation 
in its quarterly funds flow report, in which it has collapsed thrifts with commercial 
banks in an umbrella category labeled “U.S.-chartered depository institutions.”  See Q1 
2014 FUNDS FLOW / BALANCE SHEETS, supra, at iii. 
 18  Investors might object that stockholders also obtain returns in the form of 
capital gains.  See William W. Bratton, The New Dividend Puzzle, 93 GEO. L.J. 845, 846 
(2005) (reporting that “[d]uring the two decades preceding [2003], corporate boards 
steadily moved away from the dividends—the traditional vehicle for distributing profits 
to shareholders—diverting about half of the cash they distribute to shareholders to 
open-market repurchases of their firms’ own common stock” and ascribing that trend 
in large part to preferential tax treatment of capital gains relative to dividends).  While 
that is true in practice, in theory the capital gain only reflects heightened expectations 
of future dividends.  See RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 
80 (10th ed. 2011) (“[S]hare value is equal to the discounted stream of dividends per 
share.”); ASWATH DAMODARAN, INVESTMENT VALUATION 323 (3d ed. 2012) (“In the 
strictest sense, the only cash flow you receive when you buy shares in a publicly traded 
[corporation] is a dividend.”); WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 28889 (10th ed. 2007) 
(“The only thing that makes shares valuable is the expectation of payments of 
[dividends] at some time in the future.”).  
 19  But see Jonathan R. Macey & Elizabeth H. Garrett, Market Discipline by Depositors: 
A Summary of the Theoretical and Empirical Arguments, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 215, 222–23 
(1988) (“Our point is not that such regulatory devices do not exist; rather our 
arguments are (1) that these measures impose fewer constraints on excessive risk-
taking than would be optimal from a societal perspective; and (2) that they do not 
punish excessive risk-taking by individual banks in the same way as a market-driven 
system would, because these measures are uniformly applied to all banks.”).  
 20  See HELEN A. GARTEN, WHY BANK REGULATION FAILED: DESIGNING A BANK 
REGULATORY STRATEGY FOR THE 1990S xv (1991); id. at 41 (“[B]ank regulators faced the 
classic creditor’s dilemma of how to prevent unanticipated future alterations in the 
risk posture of insured banks . . . .  [In response, t]hey imposed a series of restrictive 
covenants on the banking industry designed to limit the ability of bank managers to 
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on their own, but the opacity of bank balance sheets is such that the 
costs of obtaining private information about banks’ relative credit risk 
is prohibitive.  The regulatory apparatus, then, is justified on the 
grounds of obviating the need to monitor the creditworthiness of 
banks—of making bank debt (most obviously, insured deposits), in the 
words of Professor Gary Gorton, “information-insensitive.”21 
This point took on added salience during the period from the 
1980s to the present because the charter values of banks—that is, the 
ability to benefit from regulatory restrictions on competition and 
entry—has declined as a result of competition from non-regulated 
financial institutions.22  Historically, banking law and regulation 
imposed various anti-competitive restrictions in the banking sector 
that endowed banks with market power, making their charters 
valuable.23  The charter value of a bank, then, refers to the capitalized 
benefits of these restrictions that banks enjoy.24  In the 1980s, 
technology and deregulation conspired to erode the charter value of 
 
take actions that increased the risk of loss to the insurance fund.”).  The regulatory 
intervention is also motivated by a concern to promote a stable financial system by 
counteracting externalities resulting from excessive financial risk taking—that is, risk 
taking by financial institutions that creates negative effects on third parties, such as 
users of finance, unable to protect themselves through bargaining. 
 21  See GARY B. GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007 19–23 
(2010); cf. Charles W. Calomiris & Gary Gorton, The Origins of Banking Panics: Models, 
Facts, and Bank Regulation, in FINANCIAL MARKETS AND FINANCIAL CRISES 109, 129–60 (R. 
Glenn Hubbard ed., 1991) (arguing that one purpose of banks is that they create debt 
(e.g., deposits) to serve as a medium of exchange, but that the opaqueness of the asset 
side of bank balance sheets (i.e., their loan portfolios) gives rise to an information 
asymmetry between debt holders and banks that requires intervention, either through 
clearing houses or regulation). 
 22  See A. Sinan Cebenoyan et al., Ownership Structure, Charter Value, and Risk-Taking 
Behavior for Thrifts, 28 FIN. MGMT. 43, 43–44 (1999).  Others emphasize that the largest 
banks still enjoy significant bank charter value due to the implicit perceptions of 
government support.  See Global Financial Stability Report: Moving from Liquidity- to 
Growth-Driven Markets, INT’L MONETARY FUND 104 (Apr. 2014), 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/FT/GFSR/2014/01/index.htm (“In terms of the 
funding cost advantage in 2013, these subsidies are at least 15 or so basis points in the 
United States, 25–60 basis points in Japan, 20–60 basis points in the United Kingdom, 
and 60–90 basis points in the euro area.”).  But the evidence of this position in 
equivocal, especially in the United States.  See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, LARGE 
BANK HOLDING COMPANIES: EXPECTATIONS OF GOVERNMENT SUPPORT 40 (2014), available 
at http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665162.pdf (“Our analysis and the results of 
studies we reviewed provide evidence that the largest bank holding companies had 
lower funding costs than smaller bank holding companies during the 20072009 
financial crisis but that differences may have declined or reversed in more recent 
years.”). 
 23  See Michael C. Keeley, Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking, 80 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1183, 1198 (1990). 
 24  Id. at 1185. 
WEBER (DO NOT DELETE) 10/24/2015  11:27 AM 
2015] COMPREHENSIVE CAPITAL ANALYSIS AND REVIEW  55 
banking firms.25  No longer could bank managers and investors sit back 
and comfortably enjoy earnings subsidized by the government-
imposed barriers to entry.26  As a result, the potential loss of the charter 
no longer stood as a bulwark against the moral hazard that would 
otherwise exist due to the government’s guarantee of bank debt (i.e., 
deposit insurance).27  In this new market environment, banks no 
longer enjoyed meaningful charter values.  Consequently, the moral 
hazard effect took root and banks took on additional leverage and 
embraced riskier lending programs.28  The decline in charter value of 
banks reinforced the normative justification for the bank supervisory 
system: that is, to serve as a counterweight to this moral hazard effect, 
which would otherwise result in risk-taking and leverage in excess of 
socially optimal levels, both from the perspective of the deposit insurer 
(the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) and the lender of last 
resort (the FRB). 
Dividend restrictions have historically formed a part of this 
supervisory system.  The risk of insolvency for a bank is, as with any 
firm, inversely related to its equity capitalization—that is, as the 
amount of equity decreases, less equity is available to absorb future 
losses and the risk of default on debt claims increases.29  By paying 
dividends, a bank reduces its equity.30  Therefore, it is unsurprising that 
bank regulators and policymakers have sought to restrict a bank’s 
ability to declare and pay dividends.31  Dividend regulation protects 
 
 25  See id. (measuring charter value by looking to declining market-to-book value 
ratios). 
 26  See id. at 1185–86. 
 27  See Robert C. Merton, An Analytic Derivation of the Cost of Deposit Insurance Loan 
Guarantees, 1 J. BANKING & FIN. 3, 7 (1977).  Merton described this moral hazard effect 
of deposit insurance as a put option on the bank’s assets.  If the value of the assets 
exceeds the value of the loans on the maturity date of the bank’s debt, then the 
stockholders will exercise the option and pay back the debt.  If, on the other hand, the 
value of the assets does not exceed the value of the debt, then the stockholders will let 
the option lapse and the deposit insurer will make good on the debt claims.  Cf. Keeley, 
supra note 23, at 1186. 
 28  See Keeley, supra note 23, at 1184. 
 29  See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 18, at 447–58 (discussing costs of financial 
distress).  
 30  See ROBERT J. RHEE, ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS OF BUSINESS FOR LAWYERS 60 (2012) (“A 
corporation may distribute to shareholders dividends, which are cash payments from 
equity.”).  
 31  In this Article, “bank supervision” and “bank regulation” are used 
interchangeably.  For an explanation of the difference between “regulation” and 
“supervision” in the financial regulatory context, see Frederic S. Mishkin, Prudential 
Supervision: Why Is It Important and What Are the Issues? 16–17 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Res., Working Paper No. 7926, 2000), available at http://www.nber.org/ 
papers/w7926. 
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against insolvency, thereby also limiting recourse to government safety 
nets by ensuring the bank maintains a buffer to absorb unexpected 
losses.  But it does more than that.  By requiring banks to maintain 
some equity capitalization at all times, it also ensures that 
stockholders—and, indirectly, the directors they elect to the board—
have something to lose in the event of financial distress.  Consequently, 
it promotes a corporate governance system in which stockholders are 
incentivized to guard against the possibility of failure.  If the dividend 
restrictions are meaningful, then the privatized system should police 
itself relatively well: stockholders are in effect deputized to play an 
important role in promoting financial stability and institution-level 
safety and soundness.  But notwithstanding the potential utility of 
dividend restrictions as a regulatory tool, they had largely faded into 
irrelevance prior to the recent reforms.  Dividend restrictions became 
obsolete because they relied too heavily on rigid accounting metrics to 
police dynamic, flexible institutions, and they failed to consider how 
dividends might affect a bank’s financial condition in light of future 
contingencies. 
III. THE EARLY HISTORY OF BANK DIVIDEND RESTRICTIONS 
Before explaining why traditional dividend restrictions became 
obsolete and what is meant by the new contingency of bank dividends, 
it is necessary to understand the history of dividend regulation.  The 
early history of these restrictions grows out of three landmark pieces 
of banking legislation that together created modern U.S. banking law: 
the National Bank Act of 1864, the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, and 
the Banking Act of 1933.  Whether these restrictions applied to a given 
distribution of corporate bank funds depended entirely on a snapshot 
determination of either a precise accounting metric or compliance 
with a payments system obligation.  For example, a dividend would be 
illegal if it were paid out of “capital,” a legal accounting metric with 
specialized meaning in banking law.  Similarly, a dividend would be 
illegal if it were paid when a bank failed to comply with laws concerning 
the amounts of reserves it was required to maintain.  Gradually, 
Congress introduced the more indeterminate term “unsafe and 
unsound practices” as a trigger for regulatory intervention that would 
justify, among other things, restrictions of dividends. 
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A. In Early U.S. Banking Legislation, Dividend Legality Depended on 
Rigid Accounting Metrics and Compliance with Payments Obligations 
Regulation of corporate dividends is not unique to banking law.  
Since the late nineteenth century, legislatures and regulators have 
limited the ability of all corporations, including banks, to declare 
dividends.  These restrictions, referred to as “legal capital” rules, most 
typically specify that a corporation may only declare dividends out of 
current earnings or earned surplus.32  The legislative impetus behind 
these restrictions was to afford a modicum of extra-contractual 
protection for creditors.33  In effect, the board could only declare a 
dividend after the corporation had paid its creditors, or, alternatively, 
when the corporation had accumulated earnings from previous 
accounting periods that would be available for execution by creditors.  
State legislatures included these dividend restrictions as part of general 
corporation laws that facilitated the formation of limited liability 
enterprises.34 
Unsurprisingly, Congress included dividend restrictions in its first 
general incorporation statute for federally chartered banks.35  The 
 
 32  See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 500 (West 2015) (authorizing boards of directors to 
declare dividends only from retained earnings); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170 (2015) 
(permitting corporations to declare dividends out of “surplus” or, where there is no 
surplus, out of net profits for the current and preceding year); N.Y. BUS. CORP. L. § 
510(b) (McKinney 2015) (same). 
 33  See Wood v. Dummer, 30 F. Cas. 435, 436 (Cir. Ct. D. Me. 1824) (“[T]he capital 
stock of banks is to be deemed a pledge or trust fund for the payment of the debts 
contracted by the bank.”); DONALD KEHL, CORPORATE DIVIDENDS: LEGAL AND 
ACCOUNTING PROBLEMS PERTAINING TO CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS 15 (1941) (“[T]he 
principal objective of dividend law has therefore been the preservation of a minimum 
of assets as a safeguard in assuring the payment of creditors’ claims.”).  In this respect, 
the legal capital rules share a similar purpose with fraudulent transfer laws, which 
permit certain creditors to avoid transactions that, among other things, transfer 
property of a debtor when it is, or nearly is, insolvent.  See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER 
ACT §§ 4 & 5 (1984).  Both legal devices restrict transfers of corporate property as the 
solvency of the corporation becomes impaired.  
 34  With general incorporation statutes, state legislatures created the power for any 
individual or group of individuals to form business corporations by complying with the 
same set of generally applicable criteria.  See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical 
Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1634 (1988) (“General 
business corporation acts, which permitted firms to incorporate without seeking a 
special charter from the legislature, first became popular during the Jacksonian 
period.”); see also Susan Pace Hamill, From Special Privilege to General Utility: A 
Continuation of Willlard Hurst’s Study of Corporations, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 81, 101–05 (1999) 
(chronicling history of state general incorporation statutes, from the era of initial 
experimentation in New York (1811), Pennsylvania (1836) and Connecticut (1837) to 
the Reconstruction era, by which time forty-four of the forty-seven states had enacted 
such statutes). 
 35  See National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 [hereinafter NBA] (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
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National Bank Act of 1864 (NBA) created a new category of financial 
institution, national banks, which would issue bank notes backed by 
U.S. bonds deposited with the U.S. Treasury.36  In enacting the NBA, 
Congress hoped to create a new and reliable national currency, in the 
process promoting the market for federal bonds and facilitating the 
financing of the Civil War.37  A new federal administrative agency, the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), would administer 
this new privatized and federalized banking system.38  The NBA applied 
 
 36  See id. § 16 (establishing as a condition of a national bank charter that applicant 
deposit the greater of one-third of the applicant’s paid-in capital and $30,000 in the 
form of U.S. government bonds). 
 37  See Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. 533, 548 (1869) (“These powers [to provide 
for a national currency], until recently, were only partially and occasionally exercised.  
Lately, however, they have been called into full activity, and Congress has undertaken 
to supply a currency for the entire country.”); OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE 
CURRENCY, NATIONAL BANKS AND THE DUAL BANKING SYSTEM 7 (2003) (“Backed by 
government securities, these circulating notes were designed to be the new national 
currency that would hold a stable value and could be used, reliably, across the 
nation.”).  The creation of a reliable national currency was, however, the lesser of the 
two goals; the immediate impetus behind the legislation was war finance.  National 
banks would be required to purchase federal bonds as a precondition to the grant of 
a charter, contributing to demand for U.S. government securities.  See THOMAS P. KANE, 
THE ROMANCE AND TRAGEDY OF BANKING 5 (1922) (“[The NBA] was originally a war 
measure, and it grew out of the urgent necessities of the Government to replenish the 
public treasury by creating a market for its bonds through the inducement offered 
banks to obtain circulation based upon the security of such bonds.”); Bray Hammond, 
The North’s Empty Purse, 1861-1862, 67 AM. HISTORICAL REV. 1, 11 (1961) (listing as a 
critical component of federal efforts to finance the Civil War “the authorization of a 
system of national banks, whose purchases of bonds to guarantee their issues of 
circulating notes would create a new supply of funds for the government”); cf. RANAJOY 
RAY CHAUDHURI, THE CHANGING FACE OF AMERICAN BANKING: DEREGULATION, 
REREGULATION, AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 2 (2014) (“The aims [of the NBA] 
were to create a national currency, damage the interests of the banking sector in the 
Confederate South (where a majority of the state banks were located), and, along with 
income taxes and excise duties, help finance the American Civil War for the Union.”).  
Although the national bank system traces its roots to war finance, it was only part of a 
broader array of in extremis maneuverings by the Treasury Department—such as new 
taxes and the printing of legal tender fiat currency—and ultimately proved “of far less 
help to the war than the war was of help to it.”  Hammond, supra, at 10; see also RICHARD 
H. TIMBERLAKE, THE ORIGINS OF CENTRAL BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES 85–86 (1978).  
Nevertheless, the enduring legacy of the legislation was the creation a new nationwide 
financial infrastructure buttressed by uniform currency issued by regulated banks.  See 
A. Piatt Andrew, The Crux of the Currency Question, 2 YALE L.J. 595, 609 (1913) (quoting 
Alphonso Taft, who served as the U.S. Attorney General in Ulysses Grant’s 
administration, as having stated: “if the Civil War resulted in nothing else than 
providing the country with a uniform currency it would not have been fought in vain”). 
 38  Technically, Congress had created the OCC a year earlier, in 1863, when it 
enacted the National Currency Act.  See 1 ALFRED M. POLLARD ET AL., BANKING LAW IN 
THE UNITED STATES § 2.05 (2d ed. 1999).  The NBA was seen as a corrective measure, 
and it supplanted the 1863 Act.  See BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA 
FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 731 (1957). 
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basic legal capital rules to the national banks, prohibiting them from 
effectuating distributions of corporate property, including dividends, 
out of their “capital,” a term that included the initial and any 
subsequent equity contributions by stockholders.39  As a result of this 
restriction, a bank could only pay dividends out of its retained 
earnings—that is, current earnings or past earnings kept within the 
firm and not distributed or re-invested in the bank.40 
In recognition of the special vulnerabilities of banks, Congress 
restricted dividends in additional ways that went beyond the traditional 
legal capital rules.  For example, the NBA required each national bank 
to contribute ten percent of its previous year’s earnings to a “surplus” 
fund until such fund amounted to twenty percent of its total capital 
stock before declaring any dividends at all.41  For state banks that 
converted into the new national bank form, limited liability was 
conditioned on the maintenance of the twenty percent surplus; failure 
to maintain it would trigger a prohibition on declaring dividends until 
the bank replenished the surplus.42  Stockholders receiving dividends 
in violation of these restrictions would be liable to the bank or its 
receiver unless they had a good faith belief that it was properly paid.43 
The NBA also imposed reserve requirements on national banks, 
mandating that banks maintain minimum amounts of reliable assets 
“on hand” (or on deposit with money-center banks in cities such as 
New York44)—referred to in banking law as “lawful money”45—to honor 
 
 39  NBA, supra note 35, § 38 (prohibition on withdrawal of capital); id. §§ 7–16 
(discussing initial capitalization requirements for banks and requirements relating to 
increasing or decreasing, and depositing bonds in respect of, bank “capital”). 
 40  See W. STEVE ALBRECHT ET AL., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING: CONCEPTS AND 
APPLICATIONS 28 (11th ed. 2011).  
 41  NBA, supra note 35, § 33. 
 42  Id. § 12. 
 43  See Finn v. Brown, 142 U.S. 56, 70 (1891) (“In regard to the dividend . . . it was 
clearly fraudulent and unlawful . . . .  The money belonged to the bank, and ought to 
have been restored to the bank [by the director defendant].”); McDonald v. Williams, 
174 U.S. 397, 398–99, 408 (1899) (holding receiver of a national bank could not obtain 
recovery of illegal dividend paid entirely out of the bank’s capital because “the 
stockholder receiving such dividend acted in good faith, believing the same to be paid 
out of profits”). 
 44  See NBA, supra note 35, § 32 (permitting a bank to “keep one half of its lawful 
money reserve in cash deposits in the city of New York”). 
 45  As used in the NBA, “lawful money” referred to legal tender United States notes, 
known as “greenbacks,” which had been issued in 1862 and 1863.  Edward C. Simmons, 
The Concept of Lawful Money, 46 J. POL. ECON. 108, 111 (1938).  Congress periodically 
adjusted the “lawful money” classification in the decades following the NBA to include 
specie, U.S. notes, Federal Reserve notes, clearinghouse certificates, and silver and 
gold certificates.  See Ira Cross, Lawful Money: A Note, 46 J. POL. ECON. 409, 410–11 
(1938).  Congress possesses this power under the Constitution, and since 1913 has 
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the bank notes it issued in the ordinary course.46  Congress anticipated 
how dividends might pose a threat to reserves; it expressly prohibited 
any bank whose reserves had fallen below statutory thresholds from 
paying dividends to its stockholders.47 
These dividend restrictions formed part of the regulatory 
infrastructure for this newly established, post-NBA nationwide 
financial system.48  Together with minimum initial capitalization 
levels,49 restrictions on the assets banks could hold and liabilities they 
could issue,50 deposit of government bonds as security for national 
banks notes,51 and provisions limiting bank activities to the “business of 
banking,”52 these federal interventions into what would otherwise be 
among the core—arguably the core—prerogatives of bank 
management53 promoted adequate capitalization levels at national 
 
delegated it to the FRB.  See Milam v. United States, 524 U.S. 629, 630 (9th Cir. 1974) 
(discussing Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421 (1884)).  Interestingly, national bank 
notes themselves were not lawful money—even following the enactment of the NBA.  
See, e.g., Hamilton v. State, 60 Ind. 193, 194 (1877) (reversing conviction of defendant 
for larceny of “lawful money of the United States” because defendant might have 
stolen national bank notes, which “are in no sense money of the United States”). 
 46  See NBA, supra note 35, § 31 (imposing fifteen percent reserve requirement on 
national banks that increased to twenty-five percent for banks located in statutorily 
designated money center cities); J. LAWRENCE BROZ, THE INTERNATIONAL ORIGINS OF 
THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 27–28 (1997).  A bank regulatory regime that requires 
banks to maintain minimum amounts of reliable assets as a percentage of total deposit 
liabilities is referred to as a fractional reserve banking system.  See N. GREGORY MANKIW, 
PRINCIPLES OF MACROECONOMICS 332–33 (2012) (introducing principles of fractional 
reserve banking).  
 47  See NBA, supra note 35, § 41 (prohibiting banks from “mak[ing] any dividend 
of its profits until the required proportion between the aggregate amount of its 
outstanding notes of circulation and deposits and its lawful money of the United States 
shall be restored”).  
 48  See POLLARD ET AL., supra note 38, § 2.05 (“The National Bank Act of 1864 
provided the foundation for the modern system of federal bank regulation.”).  
 49  See NBA, supra note 35, § 7 (setting forth minimum initial amounts of paid-in 
capital for national banks ranging from $50,000 to $200,000, depending on the size of 
the city in which the bank would be “organized”). 
 50  See id. § 28 (setting forth limitations on national banks’ real estate holdings); 1 
MILTON R. SCHROEDER, THE LAW AND REGULATION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ¶ 1.02 
(2012) (“The act imposed . . . restrictions on lending policies.”).  
 51  See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 52  See NBA, supra note 35, § 8 (restricting national banks only to the conduct of 
the “business of banking,” to be defined by the OCC, and providing an exhaustive list 
of legal bank powers). 
 53  Subject to fiduciary duties and legal capital rules (and special legislative-
regulatory rules for particular industries, such as the banking restrictions discussed 
above), the payment of dividends under U.S. corporate law has always been the 
exclusive province of the board of directors.  See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 
A.2d 717, 722 (Del. 1971) (applying the business judgment rule to board of directors’ 
decision to declare dividends).  
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banks and reduced perceptions of their credit risk.  In the process, they 
also bolstered confidence in the new national banking system.  
Dividend restrictions, as we have seen, served as backstops for several 
of these measures. 
Increased confidence in national banks was crucial to the 
postbellum financial system, and it differed sharply from the 
uncertainty and instability that marked the previous era of banking in 
the United States.  With the NBA, Congress had created, in effect, a 
new national currency, issued by national banks and backed by the U.S. 
Treasury Department.54  Over the next few decades, this new currency 
gradually replaced the thousands of different state bank notes that 
previously had comprised the money supply during the period 
between the demise of the Second Bank of the United States in 1836 
and the enactment of the NBA, known as the “free banking” era.55  
These state bank notes were often of dubious quality, and merchants 
had no centralized information source to rely on in determining 
whether the notes were issued by financially solid banks or poorly 
capitalized, or even insolvent, banks.56  Now that there was a 
standardized federal currency issued by reliable banks, businesses no 
 
 54  See supra notes 36 & 37 and accompanying text. 
 55  See CHAUDHURI, supra note 37, at 7–19; GARY B. GORTON, MISUNDERSTANDING 
FINANCIAL CRISES: WHY WE DON’T SEE THEM COMING 11–17 (2012); SCHROEDER, supra 
note 50, ¶ 1.02.  The national bank era was also, in a sense, a “free banking” era, 
inasmuch as there was no central governmental authority allocating credit and all 
applicants could form a bank by complying with the statute.  See HAMMOND, supra note 
38, at 727 (“The new act was a free-banking measure, derived from the original free-
banking law enacted in New York in 1838 but modified by variations thereof in other 
states.”).  In fact, on the surface all the NBA did was create another chartering entity 
(the OCC), if anything increasing the freedom of choice for would-be bank founders.  
In context, however, the coercive effect of Congressional intervention becomes 
apparent.  Congress did not merely create a new chartering option; it also imposed a 
ten percent federal tax in 1866 on state-chartered bank notes.  This tax pressured state 
banks to convert to the national bank form, which thereafter became the predominant 
form through which the business of banking was conducted.  See id. at 733–34; Veazie 
Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. 533, 548–49 (1869) (acknowledging that the tax’s purpose 
might very well have been the destruction of the state banking system, but nevertheless 
upholding its constitutionality); but cf. HAMMOND, supra note 38, at 734 (noting that 
the tax did not completely eliminate the state bank form, since money increasingly 
took the form of bank deposits, which were untaxed).  
 56  See GORTON, supra note 55, at 19; OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY: 
A SHORT HISTORY 1 (2011), available at http://www.occ.gov/about/what-we-
do/history/OCC%20history%20final.pdf (“[T]he biggest problem with state banking 
before the Civil War was that it discouraged the development of an integrated national 
market and a shared national identity.  At each destination, long-distance travelers had 
to convert their bank notes into local money, usually sustaining a loss with each 
exchange.  The cost and inconvenience were significant deterrents to interstate travel 
and commerce.”). 
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longer needed to hold a hodgepodge of disparate, potentially 
worthless notes, nor accept the risk that their counterparties would 
discount their notes.  Once national bank notes had become the norm, 
all that mattered was whether that business had enough of them to 
consummate a transaction. 
With the confidence in this new standardized, federal national 
bank note currency firmly established, bank liabilities increasingly took 
the form of deposits of currency, and checks, which represented a draw 
on those deposit accounts, became the predominant form of money 
by the close of the century.57  But this new deposit-check financial 
system revealed itself to be even less stable than the state bank note 
system that had prevailed during the free banking era.58  Whereas the 
chief problem with the free banking era was the uncertain credit 
quality of state bank notes, the problem in the post-NBA national 
banking era was that merchants did not know how much specie and 
currency, however standardized, the banks actually held to support 
their deposits.59  This uncertainty led to runs.60 
The eventual solution was the creation of a central bank in 1914 
to act as lender of last resort to shore up depositor confidence.61  The 
 
 57  See Kris James Mitchener & Matthew Jaremski, The Evolution of Bank Supervision: 
Evidence from U.S. States 16 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 20603, 
2014), available at http://www.cepr.org/sites/default/files/MITCHENER%20-
%20Bank%20Supervision.pdf (“By the end of 1900, bank notes made up less than 10% 
of all liabilities.”).  
 58  See GORTON, supra note 55, at 20–24 (observing that banking panics between the 
Civil War and establishment of the Federal Reserve System in 1914 “all involved 
demand deposits, as currency was now backed by the federal government and was no 
longer subject to runs”); ELMUS WICKER, BANKING PANICS OF THE GILDED AGE xii (2000) 
(“[T]he identifying characteristic of all major banking panics [during the period from 
the Civil War to 1907] was the general loss of depositor confidence manifest by a 
sudden and unanticipated switch from deposits to currency.”); Calomiris & Gorton, 
supra note 21, at 129–60; O.M.W. SPRAGUE, HISTORY OF CRISES UNDER THE NATIONAL 
BANKING SYSTEM (1910) (report commissioned by the National Monetary Commission, 
which Congress formed in Aldrich-Vreeland Act in 1908 in reaction to the Panic of 
1907, individuating banking “crises” in 1873, 1893, and 1907, a “panic” in 1884, and 
“financial stringency” in 1890). 
 59  But cf. supra notes 45 & 46 and accompanying text (noting that the fractional 
reserve system of the NBA required banks to maintain “lawful money” at a certain 
percentage of their total deposit and note liabilities—an amount that in any event was 
far short of their total deposit liabilities). 
 60  See supra note 58 (citing Sprague report, a study of post-NBA banking crises). 
 61  See BEN S. BERNANKE, THE FEDERAL RESERVE AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 8–9 (2014).  
In the period leading up to the creation of the Federal Reserve System, money center 
banks set up clearinghouses that served as private lenders of last resort, performing 
functions that were typically the province of central banks.  See id.; GORTON, supra note 
55, at 51 (“Before the Federal Reserve came about in the United States, banks tried to 
reduce the possibility of anyone finding secrets by creating stronger backing of 
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Federal Reserve Act of 1913 created the Federal Reserve System 
(FRS),62 a decentralized central bank system consisting of twelve 
“federal reserve banks.”  It would serve as the first central bank for the 
United States since Andrew Jackson won his battle not to renew the 
charter of the Second Bank of the United States in 1836.63  A Board of 
Governors would oversee the FRS.  The Federal Reserve Act picks up 
where the NBA left off, making adjustments to existing reserve 
requirements and applying dividend restrictions to a wider array of 
banks. 
Section 9 of the Federal Reserve Act applied the prohibition on 
dividends paid out of capital, previously applicable only to national 
banks,64 to state banks that became members of the FRS.65  The Act also 
imposed the first dividend reporting requirement on U.S. banks, 
requiring member banks to file reports with the Comptroller of the 
Currency detailing payments of dividends to stockholders.66  
Furthermore, it established new reserve requirements for all member 
banks, which included not only state member banks but also all 
national banks.67  The Act required each member bank to maintain its 
reserves with the Federal Reserve Bank of which it was a member or 
with another federal reserve bank at which it maintained an account.68  
Banks could draw on these reserves to meet existing liabilities, but they 
could not pay any dividends “unless and until the total reserve required 
by law is fully restored.”69  Again, the idea motivating the dividend 
restrictions was to ensure each bank maintained a minimum amount 
 
demand deposits.  The principal way they did this was by organizing themselves into 
clearinghouses.”); GARY B. GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007 
33–37 (2010) (discussing role of clearinghouses during the national bank era); 
WICKER, supra note 58, at 1215 (describing how the New York Clearing House 
(NYCH) issued certificates backed by the NYCH, which had the power to pool all 
member reserves, and how the persistence of banking crises notwithstanding the 
NYCH was due to its institutional failure to take collective action rather than any 
structural weakness of the clearinghouse concept). 
 62  Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (creating federal reserve banks owned by 
privately controlled “member banks” that became members of the FRS).  
 63  See HAMMOND, supra note 38, at 439. 
 64  See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 65  Federal Reserve Act, supra note 62, § 9. 
 66  Id. 
 67  Id. §§ 2, 19.  The Act required all national banks to become members of the 
FRS.   
 68  Id. § 19.  The Federal Reserve Act reserve requirements differed from the NBA 
reserve requirements, which had previously required national banks to maintain 
reserves in the form of “lawful money on hand.”   
 69  Id.; cf. supra notes 4547 and accompanying text. 
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of liquid funds that deposit creditors could withdraw, thereby 
promoting confidence in the banking system and limiting bank runs. 
The next landmark banking law legislation in the United States 
was the Banking Act of 1933, which established the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC).70  The Act created a new dividend 
restriction in the interests of another privileged creditor: the FDIC 
itself.71  The FDIC, the first federal deposit insurer, was (and still is 
today) funded by assessments from insured depository institutions.72  
The Act proscribed the payment of any dividends while any assessment 
obligations remained outstanding.73  It also required all insured banks 
to become members of the FRS, which in the process subjected all 
insured banks, including those state banks that were previously not 
members of the FRS, to the basic suite of federal bank dividend 
restrictions.74  In 1959, Congress created a new dividend contingency 
in the form of a procedural requirement that national banks must seek 
prior approval of the Comptroller of the Currency before declaring 
dividends under certain circumstances.  Specifically, the prior approval 
requirement applied where the bank proposed to declare dividends in 
a calendar year in an amount in excess of the aggregate retained net 
profits of the previous three years.75 
 
 70  Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 12, 15, 39 U.S.C.). 
 71  The Act also included the Glass-Steagall Act, which restricted securities and 
insurance activities of commercial banks, as well as affiliations between commercial 
banks and companies conducting those activities.  See PATRICIA L. MCCOY, BANKING LAW 
MANUAL §§ 7.01, 7.02[1], 7.03[1] & [3], and 7.04 (2d ed., 2015). 
 72  See generally 12 C.F.R. pt. 327 (2014) (setting forth insurance assessment 
regime). 
 73  Banking Act of 1933, supra note 70, § 8 (adding a new section 12A to the Federal 
Reserve Act).  Section 8 imposed criminal liability on directors and officers that 
“participat[e] in the declaration or payment” of such dividends.  Id. 
 74  Id. (adding new Section 12B(l)); see supra notes 39 & 65 and accompanying text 
(detailing how the Federal Reserve Act applied the NBA’s basic no-dividends-from-
capital restriction, previously applicable only to national banks, to all member banks 
of the FRS). 
 75  See Act to Amend the National Banking Laws to Clarify or Eliminate 
Ambiguities, to Repeal Certain Laws Which Have Become Obsolete, and for Other 
Purposes, § 21(a), Pub. L. 86-230, 73 Stat. 465 (1959) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 60(b) 
(2012)); OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER’S LICENSING 
MANUAL: CAPITAL AND DIVIDENDS 16 (2007), available at http://www.occ.gov/ 
publications/publications-by-type/licensing-manuals/capital3.pdf (“A bank that 
declares a dividend in excess of its current year net income may attribute dividends in 
excess of the current year’s net income to each of the prior two years, to the extent 
that there is sufficient undistributed net income in those years.”); MICHAEL P. MALLOY, 
THE CORPORATE LAW OF BANKS: REGULATION OF CORPORATE AND SECURITIES ACTIVITIES 
OF DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS 248–49 (1988) (referring to this restriction as a “net 
profits or modified earned surplus test”).  By virtue of Section 9 of the Federal Reserve 
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B. Introducing Indeterminacy into Banking Law Through the Term 
“Unsafe and Unsound Practices”: Applications to Dividend 
Restrictions 
The restrictions discussed so far leave little room for 
administrative discretion and rely on regulatory accounting methods 
to yield binary regulatory decisions: either the dividend is legal, in 
which case regulators have no role, or it is illegal, in which case 
regulators will proscribe it, order its restitution, or withdraw 
government licenses to the charter or deposit insurance.  With the 
Banking Act of 1933, Congress introduced a more indeterminate 
term—”unsafe and unsound practices”—into the U.S. banking law 
lexicon.  Subsequent legislative actions empowered bank supervisors 
to take certain actions, including ad hoc dividend restrictions, if they 
found banks (or their executives or directors) engaging in such 
practices. 
Section 30 of the Banking Act vested the FRB with authority to 
issue show-cause orders on a bank’s directors and officers engaging in 
unsafe or unsound practices in the conduct of the bank’s business.  
Such an order would require them to demonstrate why they should not 
be removed.76  In 1950, the Federal Deposit Insurance Act authorized 
the FDIC to withdraw deposit insurance where the insured bank has 
engaged or is engaged in unsafe or unsound practices.77  In 1966, 
Congress amplified regulators’ powers by authorizing them to issue 
cease-and-desist orders to banks engaging in unsafe or unsound 
practices.78  In each of these cases, Congress intentionally left the term 
ambiguous.79  The Chairman of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 
John Horne, provided the following oft-cited gloss on the term during 
testimony before Congress in 1966, over three decades after its 
insertion into the U.S. banking laws: 
 
Act, this requirement applied to all state member banks as well.  See supra note 65 and 
accompanying text.  In 1994, Congress amended the statute to refer to “net income” 
rather than “net profits,” but the requirement of prior OCC approval in such 
circumstances persists today.  See Riegle Community Development and Regulatory 
Improvement Act of 1994, § 602(h)(2), Pub. L. 103–325, 108 Stat. 2160 (1994) 
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 56).  A national bank seeking approval for such a dividend 
must submit its request to its district office.  12 C.F.R. § 5.64(b)(3) (2014). 
 76  Banking Act of 1933, supra note 70, § 30 (also providing authority to issue show-
cause orders to directors and officers of banks committing violations of law). 
 77  Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950 § 8(a), Pub. L. 81-97, 64 Stat. 873 (1950) 
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818). 
 78  Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966 §§ 101, 102, 202, Pub. L. No. 89-
695, 80 Stat. 1028, 1028, 1036, 1046 (1966) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1464(d), 1730, 
1818). 
 79  See Joseph M. Korff, Banking, 8 B.C. L. REV. 599, 606 (1967). 
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The concept of “unsafe or unsound practices” is one of 
general application which touches upon the entire field of 
the operations of a financial institution.  For this reason, it 
would be virtually impossible to attempt to catalog within a 
single all-inclusive or rigid definition the broad spectrum of 
activities which are embraced by the term . . . .  Like many 
other generic terms widely used in the law, such as “fraud,” 
“negligence,” “probable cause,” or “good faith,” the term 
“unsafe or unsound practices” has a central meaning which 
can and must be applied to constantly changing factual 
circumstances.  Generally speaking, an “unsafe or unsound 
practice” embraces any action or lack of action, which is 
contrary to generally accepted standards of prudent 
operation, the possible consequences of which, if continued, 
would be abnormal risk or loss or damage to an institution, 
its shareholders, or the agencies administering the insurance 
funds.80 
Courts have largely ratified Horne’s gloss on the indeterminate 
statutory norm.81  In this post-New Deal banking regulatory 
environment, the determination of safety or soundness required a 
highly discretionary judgment with reference to the specific facts of the 
case.82  Excessive or otherwise improper dividend payments are among 
the types of conduct that bank regulators, and courts called on to 
perform judicial review, have found to be “unsafe and unsound 
practices.”83 
 
 80  Financial Institutions Supervisory and Insurance Act of 1966: Hearings on S. 3158 and 
S. 3695 Before the H. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 49–50 (1966) 
[hereinafter Horne Testimony] (memorandum submitted by John Horne, Chairman, 
Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd.).  Horne’s discussion entered the realm of formal public 
law when the banking agencies included it in their examination manuals.  
 81  See Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Greene Cnty. Bank v. 
FDIC, 92 F.3d 633, 636 (8th Cir. 1996); Nw. Nat’l Bank v. United States, 917 F.2d 1111 
(8th Cir. 1990); Gulf Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 651 F.2d 
259 (5th Cir. 1983); cf. Franklin Sav. Ass’n v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 934 F.2d 
1127, 1145–46 (10th Cir. 1991) (stating that a bank is in an “unsafe and unsound 
condition” when it “is operated in such a manner as to cause unacceptable levels of 
risk to its depositors’ funds”).  
 82  See Lawrence G. Baxter, The Rule of Too Much Law? The New Safety/Soundness 
Rulemaking Responsibilities of the Federal Banking Agencies, 47 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 
210, 211 (1993) (contrasting the wide discretion bank regulators exercise when 
making “safety and soundness” determinations with the more “prophylactic” mode of 
regulation that imposed direct controls on the conduct of the business of banking, 
including dividend restrictions). 
 83  See Seidman v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 37 F.3d 911, 927 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(“Among the specific acts that may constitute an unsafe and unsound practice are 
paying excessive dividends, disregarding a borrower’s ability to repay, careless control 
of expenses, excessive advertising, and inadequate liquidity.”) (quotation marks 
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While Congress layered on new dividend restrictions with each 
periodic post-crisis burst of banking law reform, state legislatures did 
the opposite, attenuating the dividend restrictions embedded in the 
legal capital rules.84  Legal capital restrictions in general corporation 
statutes—that is, those laws governing non-bank, general purpose 
business corporations—became anachronisms on account of changes 
in the corporate law permitting zero-par value stock issuances.85  Where 
the “capital” base could be manipulated by legal fiat, it no longer 
remained a meaningful restriction to limit the payment of dividends 
from a corporation’s capital. 
But, as we have seen, restrictions on the ability of bank 
stockholders to receive distributions of corporate property continued.  
The source-of-strength doctrine was first articulated by the FRB in the 
1980s pursuant to its authority under the 1956 Bank Holding Company 
Act and eventually received a Congressional imprimatur in 2010.  The 
doctrine requires bank holding companies, the direct and indirect 
equity owners of banks, to contribute additional funding to bank 
subsidiaries that run into financial difficulty.86  So in the zone of 
 
omitted); First Nat’l Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of the Currency, 697 F.2d 674, 
680 (5th Cir. 1983); Thomas K. Benshop, 1992 OFIA LEXIS 14, *42 (1992) 
(prohibiting former bank director from further participation in conduct of business 
of any federally insured depository institution under Section 8(e) of the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Act due in part to a finding that bank had “engaged in unsafe and 
unsound practices in 1988 and 1989 by paying dividends which were excessive in light 
of the bank’s condition”); *** Bank, 1986 FDIC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 2, *15 (1986) 
(administrative appeals board affirming FDIC order requiring bank to “cease and 
desist from unsafe and unsound banking practices,” including “[p]aying excessive cash 
dividends in relation to the [b]ank’s net income”).  
 84  See supra notes 32 & 33 and accompanying text (discussing concept of “legal 
capital”). 
 85  See ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 144–46 (2d ed. 1968).  By permitting zero-par value (or de minimis 
par value) stock issuances, the requirement that dividends be paid out of surplus no 
longer represented a meaningful constraint on the board of directors.  The issuance 
of zero-par stock ensures that any positive equity capitalization will be surplus, which 
is defined in most statutes as total paid-in capital minus aggregate par value, because 
the aggregate par value would be zero—or, in the case of stock issued with de mininis 
par value, negligible. 
 86  The legality of the source-of-strength doctrine was contested prior to its 
adoption by Congress in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010.  See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act § 616, 12 U.S.C. § 1831o-1 (2011) (providing express statutory authority for the 
source-of-strength doctrine); Policy Statement of Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve 
Sys., 52 Fed. Reg. 15707, 15708 (1987) (providing that the FRB would consider the 
“failure” to “stand ready to use available resources to provide adequate capital funds 
to its subsidiary” an unsafe and unsound banking practice, which would trigger, among 
other things, the FRB’s authority to issue cease-and-desist orders to holding company); 
MCorp Fin., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 900 F.2d 852, 863 (5th 
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insolvency, bank stockholders might be required to make 
contributions to, rather than permitted to receive distributions from, 
banks.87 
IV. “PROMPT CORRECTIVE ACTION”: RIGID AND MANDATORY 
INTERVENTION POINTS BASED ON ACCOUNTING-BASED CAPITAL LEVELS 
The next major banking law reform ushered in a new era of bank 
capital adequacy regulation that would provide for, among many other 
things, restrictions on dividends that were to apply before the in 
extremis scenarios, such as capital impairment and reserve shortages, 
described earlier.  When it was enacted in 1991, the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) represented the 
most significant banking law reform since at least the Bank Holding 
Company Act of 1956, and perhaps since the Banking Act of 1933 that 
established the FDIC.88  Unsurprisingly for such an important reform, 
FDICIA, like the major banking law reforms before it, also provided 
for regulatory dividend restrictions.  The “prompt corrective action” 
(PCA) regime inserted a new Section 38 into the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Act,89 which represented Congress’s attempt to force bank 
regulators’ hands in the aftermath of the savings and loan debacle.90  
Following that crisis, bank and thrift supervisors were excoriated for 
having engaged in regulatory forbearance, refusing to take decisive 
action until bank capital fell too low to be remediated through 
effective supervision and enforcement.91  The problem was not an 
 
Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds, 502 U.S. 32 (1991) (holding that “the [FRB]’s 
determination that [a] holding company’s failure to transfer its assets to a troubled 
subsidiary was an ‘unsafe or unsound practice’ under § 1818(b)(1) is an unreasonable 
and impermissible interpretation of that term”). 
 87  Cf. 12 U.S.C. §§ 55 & 324 (2012) (requiring bank regulators to levy assessments 
on stockholders of national banks and state member banks of the FRS where their 
“capital stock”—that is, their legal capital—is impaired).   
 88  See KENNETH SPONG, BANKING REGULATION: ITS PURPOSES, IMPLEMENTATION, AND 
EFFECTS 85 (5th ed. 2000) (“[P]rompt corrective actions standards have become the 
primary regulatory influence over bank capital levels.”). 
 89  The Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950, § 38, Pub. L. No. 81-797, 64 Stat. 
873 (1950) (codified at 12 U.S.C § 1831o).  The FDIA established a comprehensive 
system of regulation of federal deposit insurance, providing for, among other things, 
an extensive supervisory architecture for insured banks and thrifts.   
 90  See SPONG, supra note 88, at 85 (“This system of supervision, commonly known 
as prompt corrective action, represents an attempt to provide a timely and 
nondiscretionary triggering mechanism for supervisory actions.”). 
 91  See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE SAVINGS & 
LOAN CRISIS: A CBO REPORT 9 (1992), available at https://www.cbo.gov/sites/ 
default/files/102nd-congress-1991-1992/reports/1992_01_theeconeffectsofthes 
avings.pdf (“Many analysts believe that this regulatory forbearance was an especially 
key cause of the escalating public liabilities in the S&L crisis.”); LAWRENCE J. WHITE, 
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authority deficit for supervisors—we have already seen how Congress 
empowered them to withdraw deposit insurance and to issue cease-
and-desist orders.  The problem instead was that supervisors failed to 
exercise their discretion in deploying those sanctions.92 
Under the PCA regime, Congress specified statutorily a five-part 
classificatory system for capital adequacy—”well capitalized,” 
“adequately capitalized,” “undercapitalized,” “significantly 
undercapitalized,” and “critically undercapitalized”—and instructed 
the bank supervisors to set the numerical criteria for those categories.93  
As a bank’s capital declines, its federal supervisor is empowered, and 
eventually required, to intervene to address the source of the declining 
capital levels.94  The regime functions as a capital “tripwire system” in 
which institutions are subject to increasingly stringent supervision and 
business restrictions as their health declines.95 
For example, PCA requires an “undercapitalized” bank to submit 
a “capital restoration plan” to its supervisor for approval.96  If the bank’s 
capital dips to “significantly undercapitalized” levels, the supervisor is 
required to take at least one of a series of actions, including requiring 
that the bank raise additional capital, agree to an acquisition by a 
better-capitalized institution, make certain asset divestitures, or cease 
payments of dividends.97  Once a bank becomes “critically 
undercapitalized,” PCA requires the supervisor to place it in 
 
THE S&L DEBACLE: PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS FOR BANK AND THRIFT REGULATION (1991). 
 92  Richard J. Herring, Banking Disasters: Causes and Preventative Measures: Lessons 
Derived from the U.S. Experience, in PREVENTING BANK CRISES: LESSONS FROM RECENT 
GLOBAL BANK FAILURES 209, 221–23 (Gerard Caprio, Jr. et al. eds., 1998) (noting that 
supervisors for savings and loan associations reduced capital requirements and allowed 
for more liberal accounting rules to delay regulatory intervention for financial, 
ideological and psychological reasons).  
 93  12 U.S.C. § 1831o(b)(1). The statute directs the supervisors to define the metes 
and bounds of the classifications, subject to statutory limits specified by the Congress.  
See § 1831o(c). 
 94  § 1831o(a)(2). Under the PCA regime, bank supervisors are empowered or 
required, depending on the capitalization level of the supervised bank, to mandate the 
submission of a “capital restoration plan,” “closely monitor” the bank, restrict asset 
growth, require approval for certain transactions and business development plans 
(e.g., new branching initiatives), restrict certain inter-affiliate transactions, restrict 
interest rates paid on deposits, require divestiture of assets, prohibit deposits from 
certain correspondent banks, restrict capital distributions, restrict payments on 
subordinated debt, restrict payments to senior executives, and place the bank in 
conservatorship or receivership.  See 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(e)–(i). 
 95  Baxter, supra note 82, at 212. 
 96  § 1831o(e)(2)(A). 
 97  § 1831o(f)(2).  In deciding which actions to take, the supervisor must apply 
certain presumptions in favor of certain of the actions listed in subsection (f)(2)(H).  
§ 1831o(f)(3). 
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conservatorship or receivership.98 
PCA expanded greatly the range of conditions over which bank 
regulators could exert control over matters that were traditionally the 
managerial prerogatives of bank management, including dividend 
policy.  By contrast, in the pre-PCA environment, intervention could 
occur only where bank boards of directors declared a dividend while 
the bank was experiencing in extremis financial circumstances: e.g., 
when the bank depleted its capital surplus, lacked profits out of which 
it could pay dividends, accumulated arrearages on its FDIC 
assessments, or failed to maintain adequate reserves with its federal 
reserve bank.99  With PCA, regulatory intervention is supposed to occur 
as soon as a bank is only “adequately capitalized.”  Because a bank pays 
dividends out of its capital, the PCA regime, which intervenes based on 
capitalization levels, indirectly regulates outflows of dividends from 
banks to their stockholders.  That is, a bank might decide not to pay a 
dividend to stockholders when doing so would place the bank in a new, 
lower PCA capital category.  It also directly regulates outflows of 
dividends by authorizing supervisors to restrict distributions of bank 
property to stockholders that would result in the bank becoming 
“undercapitalized.”100  As discussed in Part V of this Article, PCA 
expanded the scope of dividend restrictions somewhat, but stopped 
well short of the conjectural, counterfactual, stress-based dividend 
regulatory regime that Congress and the FRB introduced in 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 98  § 1831o(h)(3)(A). 
 99  As noted earlier in Part III, supervisors have been statutorily empowered since 
1966 to enjoin dividends even in the absence of a mandatory accounting-based or 
compliance-based trigger.  See supra note 78 (describing Congressional authorization 
of supervisory agencies to issue cease and desist orders on any bank engaging in unsafe 
or unsound practices).  That said, the 1966 authority has lied largely dormant in the 
ex ante sense, and is only invoked in an ex post enforcement capacity to enjoin a bank 
from further wrongdoing or to implement a control regime to prevent a repeat of the 
same.  The legislative purpose behind FDICIA, by contrast, was to mandate supervisory 
corrective action. 
 100  See § 1831o(d)(1)(A) (“An insured depository institution shall make no capital 
distribution if, after making the distribution, the institution would be 
undercapitalized.”). 
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V. TWO WAYS OF THINKING ABOUT BANK DIVIDEND REGULATION 
Since the Banking Act of 1933 introduced safety and soundness 
concerns into regulatory practice,101 bank supervision in the United 
States has occurred along two dimensions: a formal-mandatory dimension 
and an informal-discretionary dimension.  By looking at the history of 
dividend restrictions through this binary lens, the important and novel 
impact of the new stress testing initiative on dividend regulation stands 
more starkly in relief.  In particular, the new contingency of bank 
dividends results from the way in which bank regulators have merged 
these two dimensions for the first time in the CCAR program.  Before 
describing the new program, the following description outlines the 
characteristics of this bipartite frame of reference.  The formal-
mandatory dimension is characterized by rigid, formulaic, bright-line 
rules.  It vests little discretion in regulators and prefers to trigger 
regulatory interventions based on actual, present circumstances.  By 
contrast, the informal-discretionary dimension vests considerable 
flexibility in regulators, allowing them to intervene based on 
qualitative, discretionary judgments—even including consideration of 
hypothetical, conjectural scenarios.  When operating in the formal-
mandatory dimension, supervisors are usually performing the 
enforcement function of administrative law.  When operating in the 
informal-discretionary dimension, supervisors are undertaking a more 
fulsome regulatory project102 involving risk identification and 
assessment, decisions as to resource allocation, and discretionary 
standard-setting.103 
Figure 1 below maps the dividend restrictions discussed in the 
previous Part IV along an x-axis reflecting the rigidity of the regulatory 
program and a y-axis reflecting the extent to which the regulatory 
program contemplates the use of regulatory discretion to consider 
hypothetical, future scenarios. 
 
 
 101  See supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing introduction of “unsafe 
and unsound practices” term in the banking law lexicon). 
 102  See Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167 (1962) 
(“Expert discretion is the lifeblood of the administrative process . . . .”). 
 103  See John S. Applegate, Worst Things First: Risk, Information, and Regulatory Structure 
in Toxic Substances Control, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 277, 305 (1992) (describing the “four 
phases” of regulatory action as hazard identification, allocation of resources, standard 
setting, and standard enforcement). 
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Figure 1: Regulatory Map of U.S. Bank Dividend Regulations 
According to Their Rigidity and Use of Regulatory Discretion 
Most of the action is in the lower left quadrant, which spatializes 
the familiar formal-mandatory dimension of bank dividend regulation.  
The informal-discretionary dimension is represented by the upper 
right quadrant.  Regulators have been empowered to regulate 
dividends in this quadrant since 1933, when they acquired the power 
to monitor “unsafe and unsound practices” of regulated banks and 
their directors and officers.104  Nevertheless, regulatory activity—as 
distinguished from regulatory authority—has been sparse in this 
quadrant.  The empty bottom right quadrant reflects an implicit 
assumption that where actual, present circumstances justify regulatory 
intervention, the rigid tools populating the lower left quadrant will 
 
 104  See supra notes 76–83 and accompanying text (chronicling how bank supervisors 
were successively empowered to take certain actions predicated on a finding of an 
“unsafe or unsound practice,” including issuing show-cause orders on bank executives 
in 1933, withdrawing deposit insurance in 1950, and issuing cease-and-desist orders in 
1966).  
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best promote regulatory objectives.  The blank upper left quadrant is 
where the CCAR program, to be discussed in Part VI, unites elements 
of the informal-discretionary quadrant and the formal-mandatory 
quadrant in a new system of bank dividend regulation.  This new system 
is both rigid and hypothetical.  It allows regulators to consider the 
effects of future scenarios on a bank, but also tethers those scenarios 
to a system of rigid numerical trigger points that require intervention 
by regulators.  This latter point is important because it is a potential 
antidote to regulators’ historical tendency towards inaction based on 
what they perceive to be future, conjectural risks of loss. 
A.  The Formal-Mandatory Dimension of Bank Supervision 
The formal-mandatory dimension has historically been the 
province of Congress and consists of bright-line legal rules that require 
precise applications, often carrying with them coercive sanctions.  
Prominent examples of the formal-mandatory dimension include 
prophylactic measures such as asset restrictions and the Glass-Steagall 
Act’s prohibition on affiliations of commercial banks with securities 
firms and insurance companies.105  As far as dividends are concerned, 
we see this dimension in the prohibitions on declaring dividends when 
a bank is not in compliance with its reserve requirements,106 when a 
bank is in arrears with respect to its FDIC assessments,107 and when a 
dividend would cut into a bank’s “capital surplus”108 or would be paid 
in an amount in excess of three-year accumulated profits.109  With PCA, 
Congress cemented the formal-mandatory dimension with a series of 
prescriptive, formulaic statutory rules: a system of mandatory 
intervention points calibrated to bank capitalization levels.110  The law 
restricts the authority of a bank’s board of directors to declare 
dividends based on precise calculations of the bank’s capitalization 
level.111  There is little room for administrative discretion in PCA and 
these other formal-mandatory regulatory tools. 
Because the regulatory responses contemplated by the formal-
mandatory dimension are automatic, they rely on precisely calculated 
triggering events.  These triggering events are calibrated to payments 
systems (e.g., whether the bank has transferred funds to satisfy its 
 
 105  See MCCOY, supra note 71, § 7.01 (briefly describing the Glass-Steagall Act). 
 106  See supra note 69 and accompanying text (discussing reserve requirements for 
member banks of the Federal Reserve System). 
 107  See supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing insurance fund 
assessments for FDIC-insured banks). 
 108  See supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing statutory limitations on 
paying dividends out of surplus). 
 109  See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing OCC approval 
requirement for such dividends). 
 110  12 U.S.C. § 1831o. 
 111  See supra Part IV (describing automatic triggering points in PCA regime). 
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assessment obligations to the FDIC fund) or accounting systems (e.g., 
whether a bank dividend causes a negative balance in the accounting 
entries that sum to a bank’s “capital surplus”).  Moreover, many of the 
formal-mandatory rules apply in narrow, in extremis contexts.  For 
example, if an institution were unable to pay its modest assessments to 
the FDIC—its most important creditor in its capacity of guarantor of 
most of its liabilities—it would almost certainly be defaulting on its 
other obligations.  PCA, on the other hand, was designed to apply not 
just at an institution’s death bed—in the parlance of PCA, when it was 
“critically undercapitalized”—but also as its health began to decline 
and restorative action was possible.  From 1991 to 2010, PCA 
constituted the most direct source of coercive power that could be 
brought to bear on banks, and it also represented the principal means 
by which regulators could interfere with bank dividend policy.112  
Notwithstanding its novelty as a regulatory technology, its reliance on 
intervention triggers, calibrated to precise capital accounting entries, 
places the PCA regime firmly within the formal-mandatory tradition of 
bank regulation.113 
 
 112  It is also noteworthy that PCA is coercive with respect to the supervisors 
themselves.  See generally George G. Kaufman & George J. Benston, The Intellectual 
History of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, in ASSESSING 
BANK REFORM: FDICIA ONE YEAR LATER 19 (George G. Kaufman & Robert E. Litan eds., 
1993) (noting that a primary purpose of FDICIA was to restrict regulatory forbearance, 
which was perceived to have exacerbated the extent of FDIC losses during the savings-
and-loan debacle). 
 113  FDICIA did more than institute the formal-mandatory PCA regime; it also 
played an important role to bolster the informal-discretionary dimension of bank 
regulation, discussed at length below.  For example, it required bank managers to 
attest to the adequacy of internal controls and required bank supervisors to 
promulgate standards relating to, and review during examinations, bank risk 
management capabilities and internal controls.  See § 1831p-1(d) (setting forth 
mandate to prescribe safety and soundness standards); Robert F. Weber, An Alternative 
Story of the Law and Regulation of Risk Management, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1005, 1027–28 
(2013).  Even more innovatively, the PCA regime itself authorized supervisors to 
reclassify a bank’s PCA capital category (in order to apply PCA restrictions 
anticipatorily) if the regulator determines that the bank is engaging in an unsafe or 
unsound practice.  § 1831o(g)(1) (codifying § 38(g) of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Act).  This Section 38(g) reclassification authority in some ways anticipates the CCAR 
program, inasmuch as it relies on both rigid accounting metrics (in the form of the 
base PCA categorization) and discretionary actions (in the form of finding an unsafe 
and unsound practice to exist).  Notwithstanding its innovativeness as a regulatory 
technology, Section 38(g) has rarely been utilized by supervisors. See U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DEPOSIT INSURANCE: ASSESSMENT OF REGULATORS’ USE OF 
PROMPT CORRECTIVE ACTION PROVISIONS AND FDIC’S NEW DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEM 
39–40 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/260/256614.pdf [hereinafter 
GAO PCA REPORT].  
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B.  The Informal-Discretionary Dimension of Bank Supervision 
Congress inaugurated the informal-discretionary dimension of 
bank regulation when it instructed regulators in the Banking Act of 
1933 to discipline banks engaging in “unsafe or unsound practices.”114  
Today, the most important application of informal-discretionary bank 
regulation occurs during the bank examination process, where it exists 
in shadow form, casting its influence over the discussions between 
examiners and management.  During examinations, supervisors 
interface regularly with bank management and personnel, especially 
risk management departments.  According to former FRB Chairman 
Ben Bernanke, the heart of the modern bank examination is reviewing 
the risk management infrastructure of banks.115  While conducting 
examinations, supervisors learn how banks operate and assess how they 
manage risks.  Supervisors also engage in discussions with management 
about how to improve their risk management practices. 
These discussions occur against the background threat of 
initiating severe supervisory actions—such as cease-and-desist orders 
and removal orders that impose lifetime bans on executives or 
directors from serving in the industry—predicated on a finding of an 
unsafe or unsound practice.116  Other sanctions also apply in the 
background, including the ability of supervisors to require prior 
approval for executive and board member appointments if the 
supervisor finds that the bank or bank holding company is “in a 
troubled condition.”117  Supervisors frequently use informal 
enforcement mechanisms as well, such as entering into memoranda of 
understanding with the bank,118 requiring the bank to execute board 
 
 114  See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text (describing how the term “unsafe 
or unsound practices” entered the banking law lexicon). 
 115  Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks 
at the Stonier Graduate School of Banking, Wash., D.C. (June 12, 2006) (referring to 
such review as “the heart of the modern bank examination”); see also Mishkin, supra 
note 31, at 16 (“In the ‘supervisory approach’ bank examiners focus less on 
compliance with specific regulatory rules and the risks of the financial instruments 
currently in the bank’s portfolio and more on the soundness of the bank’s 
management practices with regard to controlling risk.”). 
 116  See supra note 78 (introducing supervisors’ authority to issue cease-and-desist 
orders for banks engaging in unsafe and unsound practices); § 1818(e)(1) 
(authorizing bank supervisors to initiate removal actions against “institution-affiliated 
parties” such as executives and directors where such parties engage in unsafe or 
unsound practices that “involve[] personal dishonesty on the part of such party” or 
“demonstrate[] willful or continuing disregard by such party for the safety or 
soundness of such insured depository institution or business institution”). 
 117  See § 1831i(a)(1).  
 118  See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., COMMERCIAL BANK EXAMINATION 
MANUAL § 5020.1 (2012), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
boarddocs/supmanual/cbem/cbem.pdf (defining a memorandum of understanding 
between bank supervisor and bank as “a good faith understanding between the bank’s 
directorate and the Reserve Bank concerning the principal problems and the bank’s 
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resolutions to address problems,119 and extracting a “commitment 
letter” from bank management.120  Against the backdrop of this arsenal 
of informal and formal enforcement tools, supervisors use their “moral 
suasion” to influence bank governance.121  The bank examination 
process is shrouded with secrecy, and most information about 
communications between examiners and bank personnel is 
confidential under applicable agency regulations.122  Consequently, the 
mechanics of this process are opaque, and data about bank 
examinations and informal enforcement of safety-and-soundness is 
unavailable. 
We do know, however, that formal enforcement of safety and 
soundness is largely non-existent for the largest, most significant 
banks.  To the extent it is enforced at all, it is done so in an ex post 
capacity, as a backwards-looking disciplinary device for past behavior.  
Such a status quo is the regulatory path of least resistance.  The 
supervisory task is complicated because a supervisory intervention 
might be justified on safety and soundness grounds before a bank has 
formally seen its capital fall below the statutory PCA thresholds that 
vest supervisors with mandatory remedial authority.123  For instance, 
under applicable judicial precedent, a cease-and-desist order is 
certainly appropriate124 where a bank is assuming outsized net positions 
in derivatives markets that yield impressive profits but expose the bank 
 
proposed remedies”). 
 119  The FRB frequently uses board resolutions as an informal supervisory 
mechanism. In subsequent examinations, supervisors assess whether the bank has 
implemented the board resolutions.  See id. § 6000.1.  
 120  See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 
MANUAL NO. 5310-3 app. A (2011), available at http://www.occ.gov/ 
static/publications/ppm-5310-3.pdf (“A Commitment Letter is a document signed by 
the bank’s board of directors on behalf of the bank and is acknowledged by an 
authorized OCC official, reflecting specific written commitments to take corrective 
actions in response to problems or concerns identified by the OCC in its supervision 
of the bank.”).  
 121  See GAO PCA REPORT, supra note 113, at 40 (defining moral suasion as 
“reminding the board of directors that it has an obligation to ensure that the 
institution is competently managed”). 
 122  See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 4.36(b) (2015) (“It is the OCC’s policy regarding non-public 
OCC information that such information is confidential and privileged.  Accordingly, 
the OCC will not normally disclose this information to third parties.”); id. § 4.32(b) 
(defining “non-public OCC information” broadly to include, among other things, 
most communications between supervisory staff and bank personnel).  
 123  See GAO PCA REPORT, supra note 113, at 41 (“The regulators acknowledged that 
section 38 permits them to reclassify an institution’s capital category to dismiss an 
officer or director; however, they said that because section 38 only allows them to 
dismiss individuals from institutions that are undercapitalized or worse by PCA 
standards, the tool generally is not available to them in these good economic times 
when all or most of the institutions they regulate are well capitalized.”).  
 124  See infra notes 179–88 and accompanying text (summarizing judicial 
interpretation of “unsafe and unsound practices”). 
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to risks that might compromise the bank’s solvency.125  But the event 
triggering the regulatory intervention is a corporate practice and the 
harm to be avoided is a potential, hypothetical loss—a loss that has not 
yet occurred, and quite possibly will never occur.  For this reason, 
supervisors have historically avoided making formal findings of unsafe 
and unsound practices for the largest banks.126 
In fact, during the period of 2007–2010, which marks the most 
unstable financial market environment in nearly a century, none of the 
federal bank supervisors commenced a formal enforcement action 
against any of the twenty largest banks or bank holding companies on 
safety and soundness grounds.  In retrospect, this observation is 
staggering.  The large banks continued to return capital to 
stockholders through dividends and share repurchases even after the 
financial crisis started and the FRB and U.S. Treasury were supporting 
markets.127  And supervisors never objected.128  This pre-crisis track 
record is unsurprising in light of the minimalist view of supervisors’ 
legal authority held by some supervisory officials.  According to this 
passive interpretation of supervisory authority, supervisors lack the 
legal authority to object to risky bank lending and business practices.129  
This perspective contrasts with the implicit message underlying 
 
 125  See, e.g., Justin Baer & Julie Steinberg, Bank Rule Challenges Wall Street, WALL ST. 
J., Dec. 11, 2013, at A1 (reporting how revelations that a single J.P. Morgan trader, 
nicknamed the “London Whale,” caused his employer to incur multibillion dollar 
losses in connection with ill-advised derivatives trades, bolstered the case for tougher 
implementation standards of the so-called “Volcker Rule” from the Dodd-Frank Act, 
which aimed to require depository institutions to divest or otherwise cease most of 
their proprietary trading businesses and private equity activities); Dan Fitzpatrick et 
al., J.P. Morgan Ordered to Fix Lapses, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2013, at C1 (noting that total 
losses from the London Whale scandal eventually amounted to six billion dollars). 
 126  See Robert F. Weber, Drug Courts for the Banks (2014) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the author) (highlighting historic tendency for supervisors 
to enforce safety and soundness norms only on small banks); cf. Julie Anderson Hill, 
Bank Capital Regulation by Enforcement: An Empirical Study, 87 IND. L.J. 645 (2012) 
(registering a similar unwillingness on the part of supervisors to initiate capital 
enforcement actions against the twenty-five largest banks). 
 127  See Hirtle, supra note 5, at 3–4.  
 128  See Tim P. Clark & Lisa H. Ryu, CCAR and Stress Testing as Complementary 
Supervisory Tools, http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/ccar-and-stress-testing-
as-complementary-supervisory-tools.htm (“[T]he continuation of capital distributions 
at many large bank holding companies (BHCs) well after it became apparent that 
there was substantial deterioration in the operating environment highlights the extent 
to which supervisors . . .  underestimated the effect that stressed conditions could have 
on BHCs’ financial soundness.”). 
 129  See Thomas M. Hoenig, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Kan. City, Remarks at 
the 2008 Institute of International Finance Membership Meeting: Perspectives on the 
Recent Financial Turmoil (Mar. 5, 2008) at 8, available at 
https://www.kansascityfed.org/~/media/files/publicat/speechbio/hoenigpdf/hoen
igbrazil3708.pdf [hereinafter Hoenig Brazil Remarks] (“[I]n many situations, there 
may be no legal basis for requiring a change in business or lending practices.”).  
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Bernanke’s more maximalist position that the heart of the modern 
bank examination is supervisory review of risk management and other 
corporate systems.130  As a description of legal authority, the minimalist 
view is incorrect; but as a positive description of regulatory praxis, the 
minimalist view might well be accurate.  The lack of publicly available 
data concerning informal enforcement complicates any effort to assess 
which of the two views is more prevalent, but a recent whistleblower 
exposé of the holding company-level examination of Goldman Sachs 
by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York suggests that the minimalists 
have the upper hand and that examiners are not shaping risk 
management practices at the largest banks in any meaningful way.131  
So too does the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s publicly 
announced more conciliatory enforcement posture.  Its examiners do 
not examine anymore; instead, they manage relationships.132 
Instead of prophylactically sanctioning banks engaging in unsafe 
and unsound practices uncovered during examinations, supervisors 
have historically shown more willingness to enter into consent cease-
and-desist orders predicated on past unsafe and unsound practices that 
have already resulted in losses.  In that capacity, the regulatory sanction 
functions more as a remedy for prior failures than a prophylaxis 
against future failures. 
We might label these ex post findings of unsafe and unsound 
practices, as distinguished from the implicit threat of making ex ante 
findings before the practices result in losses.  Whereas both types of 
findings occur along the informal-discretionary dimension, the latter 
are, from political and institutional perspectives, more difficult to 
administer.133  Compared with adjudications of past facts, anticipatory 
 
 130  See supra note 115 and accompanying text (reporting Bernanke’s comments 
that review of risk management function is the “heart” of the modern bank 
examination).  
 131  See Jake Bernstein, Inside the New York Fed: Secret Recordings and a Culture Clash, 
PROPUBLICA (Sept. 26, 2014), http://www.propublica.org/article/carmen-segarras-
secret-recordings-from-inside-new-york-fed; Improving Financial Supervision: Examining 
and Addressing Regulatory Capture: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and Consumer 
Prot. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. 52 (2014) 
(testimony of David O. Beim, Professor, Prof’l Practice, Columbia Bus. Sch. regarding 
a report he wrote, commissioned in 2009 by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
which identified a “weak form of regulatory capture,” predicated on revolving doors 
and information asymmetries, as an institutional shortcoming of bank supervisors), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg93411/pdf/CHRG-
113shrg93411.pdf.  
 132  See Caroline Salas & Bradley Keoun, New York Fed’s Dahlgren Overhauls Bank 
Supervision to Beef Up Oversight, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 21, 2011), http:// 
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-03-21/new-york-fed-s-dahlgren-overhauls-
bank-supervision-to-beef-up-oversight.  
 133  Another example of the ex ante application of informal-discretionary 
regulation results from the Dodd-Frank Act’s requirement that large banks prepare 
“living wills” that detail how they could be resolved in an orderly manner.  Specifically, 
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evasions of future hypothetical harms face higher justificatory 
hurdles—and the largest banks can employ a cadre of expensive 
lawyers to make their case.  For example, the OCC made no ex ante 
unsafe and unsound practice findings for JPMorgan Chase & Co. over 
the past decade, but entered consent cease-and-desist orders 
predicated on ex post findings concerning the following unsafe and 
unsound practices: the “robo-signing” scandal,134 the “London Whale” 
trading losses,135 custodial service failures in connection with the 
Madoff fraud,136 and anti-money laundering control failures.137  In each 
of these cases, supervisors disciplined the bank in the aftermath of highly 
salient reports of corporate failures. 
This informal-discretionary examination process is a dialogic, 
negotiated governance setting.138  It has the potential to influence 
 
the Act authorizes the FRB to order asset divestitures in the event that the FRB finds a 
bank’s resolution plans are not “credible”—a determination committed to the FRB’s 
discretion.  Dodd-Frank Act § 165(d), 12 U.S.C. § 5365(d) (2011) (providing that FRB 
can require resubmission of initial proposed living will and authorizing divestiture 
powers where the resubmitted plan constitutes a “failure to submit [a] credible plan”). 
 134  JPMorgan Chase Bank, No. 2011-050 (Dep’t of Treasury Apr. 13, 2011), available 
at http://www.occ.gov/static/enforcement-actions/ea2011-050.pdf (consent cease-
and-desist order arising out of findings of unsafe or unsound practices in residential 
mortgage servicing and initiation and handling of foreclosure proceedings). 
 135  JPMorgan Chase Bank, No. 2013-001 (Dep’t of Treasury Jan. 14, 2013), available 
at http://www.occ.gov/static/enforcement-actions/ea2013-001.pdf (consent cease-
and-desist order arising out of findings of unsafe or unsound practices in the credit 
derivatives trading strategy implemented by the bank’s “chief investment office” that 
resulted in six billion dollars in losses to the bank); see also supra note 125 and 
accompanying text (providing more details of the “London Whale” episode).  
 136 JPMorgan Chase Bank, No. 2014-001 (Dep’t of Treasury Jan. 7. 2014), available 
at http://www.occ.gov/topics/laws-regulations/enforcement-actions/bank-
enforcement-actions/civil-money-penalties/ea-2014-001.pdf (consent cease-and-desist 
order arising out of findings of unsafe and unsound practices in, among other things, 
custodial services for Madoff investment funds). 
 137  JPMorgan Chase Bank, No. 2013-002 (Dep’t of Treasury Jan. 14, 2013), available 
at http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2013/nr-occ-2013-8a.pdf 
(consent cease-and-desist order arising out of findings of unsafe or unsound practices 
in deficient anti-money laundering compliance program). 
 138  Notwithstanding the lack of formal enforcement efforts against large banks 
along the informal-discretionary dimension of bank regulation, the principle that 
corporate practices, rather than outputs, are proper subjects of regulatory control is 
hardly novel or controversial.  Michael Power has observed that such regulatory 
directives “turn organizations inside out”—that is, they divert the gaze of internal and 
external governance systems from externally verifiable performance outputs (such as 
the PCA’s capitalization levels) to the internal and auditable organizational processes 
on which the performance outputs depend.  Michael Power, The Risk Management of 
Everything: Rethinking the politics of uncertainty, DEMOS (2004), http:// 
www.demos.co.uk/files/riskmanagementofeverything.pdf.  They eschew reliance on 
precise calculations in favor of a focus on how institutions process, respond to, and 
prepare for contingencies.  Cary Coglianese and David Lazer have referred to this 
method of regulatory governance as “management-based regulation.”  See Cary 
Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management 
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dividend policy if bank regulators consider and discuss with bank 
management whether declaring dividends under certain 
circumstances could constitute an unsafe and unsound practice.  The 
designation of a past or proposed dividend as an unsafe and unsound 
practice, like the violation of a formal-mandatory prescription, triggers 
a suite of coercive sanctions.  The determination itself, however, is 
highly context-specific and idiosyncratic, and requires a high degree 
of discretionary judgment on the part of the regulator.  In that respect, 
it differs dramatically from the triggering event in the formal-
mandatory dimension, which is usually an accounting shortfall or 
payment.  In this context, the exercise of administrative discretion is 
not, on account of the indeterminacy of the triggering event, 
susceptible to a lawmaking approach characterized by general 
applicability and precise accounting metrics.  When bank regulators 
consider whether declaring or paying a dividend constitutes an unsafe 
and unsound practice, they engage in a forward-looking analytic exercise 
that requires them to take into account how a dividend might affect 
the bank under future, hypothetical states of the world.  This exercise 
contrasts sharply with the formal-mandatory dimension, which relies 
on processing precise and current calculations (of, e.g., “capital 
surplus”) through a binary decision matrix—that is, either the 
dividend is illegal because it would deplete the surplus or it is legal 
because it would not.  Professor Mehrsa Baradaran has coined the apt 
term “regulation by hypothetical” to capture the idea that 
governmental power is deployed based on indeterminate and 
hypothetical informational inputs.139  Moreover, the discretionary 
quality of the agency’s determination invites all relevant actors to 
deliberate on the risks facing the business and to reconsider their 
perspectives as the future unfolds.140 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 691 (2003).  They look at corporate and 
managerial practices rather than accounting metrics, and as such are more amenable 
to informal discussions and discretionary judgment. 
 139  See Mehrsa Baradaran, Regulation by Hypothetical, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1247, 1249 
(2014) (“Regulation by hypothetical refers to rules duly promulgated under 
appropriate statutory and regulatory mechanisms that require banks and their 
regulators today to make predictions about sources of crisis and weakness tomorrow.  
Those predictions—which, by their very definition, are conjectural and speculative, 
even hypothetical—then become the basis of the use of the state’s regulatory power.”).  
 140  See Sidney Shapiro et al., The Enlightenment of Administrative Law: Looking Inside 
the Agency for Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 470 (2012). 
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C.  Integrating the Informal-Discretionary Dimension into the Broader 
Literature on “Risk Regulation” 
When acting pursuant to the informal-discretionary dimension, 
bank supervisors exercise their regulatory discretion to intervene in 
activity based on the risk of future, uncertain, hypothetical adverse 
outcomes—in other words, on outcomes that might occur, but have 
not yet occurred.  These interventions can be situated in a broader 
literature on “risk regulation” in the environmental, health, and safety 
regulatory contexts.  In particular, they share with these risk regulatory 
regimes a statutory trigger mechanism predicated on a necessarily 
uncertain harm.  In other words, the legality of the regulatory 
intervention depends on a determination that is subject to some 
amount of uncertainty.  This marriage of uncertainty and law is 
unavoidably fraught with weighty concerns—about accountability, 
legitimacy, science, and even democracy—that are outside the scope 
of this Article, but the parallels drawn here demonstrate that the 
informal-discretionary dimension is quite active in other areas of 
administrative law. 
Risk regulation is a slippery moniker with a range of related, but 
rarely identical, connotations.141  To some extent, the varied uses of the 
term reflect theoretical and disciplinary differences in the ways risk is 
conceived.142  Any attempt to define risk regulation, however, must start 
with the burst of environmental, health, and safety regulation that 
emerged in the 1960s and 1970s.  This legislative activity was the 
political expression of increased societal concerns over latent and 
uncertain dangers to health and the environment resulting from new 
technologies in the latter part of the twentieth century.143  David 
 
 141  See Elizabeth Fisher, Framing Risk Regulation: A Critical Reflection, 2 EURO. J. RISK 
REG. 125, 126 (2013). 
 142  See Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon, Embracing Risk, in EMBRACING RISK: THE 
CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY 1, 20–21 (Tom Baker & Jonathan 
Simon eds., 2002) [hereinafter EMBRACING RISK] (registering transatlantic divide in 
conceptions of the idea of risk regulation); NIKLAS LUHMANN, RISK: A SOCIOLOGICAL 
THEORY 1–4 (1993) (registering disciplinary divides in the conception of risk more 
generally). 
 143  Sheila Jasanoff, Risk in Hindsight—Towards a Politics of Reflection, in RISK SOCIETY 
AND THE CULTURE OF PRECAUTION 28, 30 (Ingo K. Richter et al. eds., 2006) (“In the 
latter half of the terrifying twentieth century, risk became a major concern of 
governments.”); NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: 
MANAGING THE PROCESS 1 (1983) [hereinafter NRC RED BOOK] (“The decade of the 
1970s was a period of heightened public concern about the effects of technology on 
the environment.”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 11 (2002) (arguing that “commitments [embodied in 1970s 
environmentalism] helped to spur national risk regulation in [the] United States (and 
elsewhere)”); William Boyd, Genealogies of Risk: Searching for Safety, 1930s1970s, 39 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 895, 897 (2012). 
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Garland describes this process as an adjunct to that of development: 
“[h]istory has caught up with modern societies, causing them to focus 
less and less upon technical and economic development, and more 
and more upon the problem of managing the hazards that this 
development entails.”144  Whether we are living in a new age of higher 
statistical probabilities of catastrophic risks occurring—in something 
akin to what Ulrich Beck famously labeled a “risk society”—is a 
contestable proposition.145  But it is not contestable that much of 
regulatory praxis today, in the United States and abroad, consists of 
initiatives aiming to reduce exposures to future uncertain hazards. 
Ulrich Beck argues that this increased risk consciousness impacts 
the way people and organizations, including regulatory agencies, act: 
“the actual social impetus of risks lies in the projected dangers of the 
future.”146  “We become active today,” Beck continues, “in order to 
prevent, alleviate or take precautions against the problems and crises 
of tomorrow and the day after tomorrow—or not to do so.”147  Whatever 
the underlying societal causes of this increased governmental attention 
to risk, it is plausible to refer to a new “risk state” or “risk regulatory 
state” in which the predicate for current action is the prospect of future 
harm.148  As a result, risk has become an organizing principle of 
 
 144  David Garland, The Rise of Risk, in RISK AND MORALITY 48, 74 (Richard V. Ericson 
& Aaron Doyle eds., 2003).  
 145  See, e.g., ORTWIN RENN, RISK GOVERNANCE: COPING WITH UNCERTAINTY IN A 
COMPLEX WORLD 30 (2008) (observing that “[t]he novel character of risk does not 
seem as novel as Beck claims”); IAIN WILKINSON, ANXIETY IN A RISK SOCIETY 108 (2001) 
(“For Beck, actuarial guarantees of safety are irrelevant in light of the knowledge that 
there are still rare occasions where the statistically improbable event of disaster takes 
place.”); IAIN WILKINSON, RISK, VULNERABILITY AND EVERYDAY LIFE 45 (2010) (“Beck’s 
representation of the reality of the risks we face is open to a great deal of critical debate 
and he readily admits to this.”); Sophie Day, The Politics of Risk Among London Prostitutes, 
in RISK REVISITED 29, 51 (Pat Caplan ed., 2000) (“Much of what Beck describes . . . has 
long been standard for those without much money or control over their lives.”); Mary 
Douglas, Risk as a Forensic Resource, 119 DAEDALUS 1, 8 (1990) (claiming that while 
modern technological risks are “only too horribly real,” the distinguishing feature of 
contemporary risk discourse is that it, like sin and taboo in former times, posits a causal 
relationship between behaviors and decisions and real-world danger in an effort to 
protect a valued institution—in our case, individual liberty); Peter Huber, Safety and 
the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 
277, 277 (1985) (arguing that the legal system is unduly preoccupied with and biased 
against “public risks,” defined as “threats to human health and safety that are centrally 
or mass-produced, broadly distributed, and largely outside the individual risk bearer’s 
direct understanding and control”); Nikolas Rose, The Death of the Social?, 25 ECON. & 
SOC’Y 327, 341–43 (1996) (arguing that heightened attention to risk results from a 
“strategic shift . . . in the politics of security” whereby individuals are urged by 
politicians to “re-responsibiliz[e]” themselves for the management of their own risks).  
 146  ULRICH BECK, THE RISK SOCIETY: TOWARD A NEW MODERNITY 34 (1992).  
 147  Id.  
 148  See Julia Black, The Role of Risk in Regulatory Processes, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF REGULATION 302, 302 (Robert Baldwin et al. eds., 2010).  
WEBER (DO NOT DELETE) 10/24/2015  11:27 AM 
2015] COMPREHENSIVE CAPITAL ANALYSIS AND REVIEW  83 
governments,149 and regulation increasingly reflects, and also 
nourishes, a new moral climate of risk politics that conceives of and 
expects regulatory initiatives to affect the future by identifying risks 
and allocating risk burdens.150 
The newness of state intervention into risk should not be 
overstated.  To that end, two caveats are in order.  The first caveat is 
dealt with more straightforwardly.  The judiciary (itself an organ of the 
state) has long concerned itself with risk allocation, albeit in an ex post 
capacity.  The risk regulation era sees the role of law transformed from 
the guarantor of ex post compensation for harms through court 
systems to ex ante risk mitigator of harms through regulatory 
initiatives.151 
The second caveat is that, to some extent, all regulatory systems 
aim to control some form of risk, broadly defined.152  Traditional 
economic regulation was concerned with managing the effects of 
monopoly or state-granted privileges.153  Later on, legislators 
envisioned a role for regulation in correcting information 
asymmetries.  It is possible to say, for example, that utility rate 
regulation was designed to prevent the “risk” that monopolistic pricing 
practices would afflict the electricity market, or that securities 
registration requirements aim to reduce the “risk” that retail investors 
are bilked by investor promoters.  Some authors categorize regulatory 
programs to correct for negative externalities within the risk regulatory 
 
 149  See Applegate, supra note 103, at 305.  
 150  See ANTHONY GIDDENS, RUNAWAY WORLD: HOW GLOBALIZATION IS RESHAPING OUR 
LIVES 47–48 (2000); DAVID A. MOSS, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS: GOVERNMENT AS THE 
ULTIMATE RISK MANAGER (2002); Anthony Giddens, Risk and Responsibility, 62 MODERN 
L. REV. 1, 5 (1999) (referring to the “new moral climate of politics” that characterizes 
risk policy). 
 151  See NIKLAS LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM 417 (Fatima Kastner et al. eds., 
Klaus A. Ziegert trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2004) (contrasting liability regimes with 
regimes that prevent an “injury has not yet materialized or is not immediately 
threatening”); SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: 
RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 3 (2003) (“By the late 1960s, Congress had 
determined that the tort system, augmented by minimal federal regulation, was 
incapable of providing an effective response to the increasing threats to the public 
health and safety and the environment attributable to new technologies and 
development.”); Jonathan B. Wiener, Risk Regulation and Governance Institutions, in RISK 
AND REGULATORY POLICY: IMPROVING THE GOVERNANCE OF RISK 133, 141 (2010).  
 152  See Saule T. Omarova, License to Deal: Mandatory Approval of Complex Financial 
Products, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 63, 79 n.72 (2012).   
 153  See R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR 
ACT 5–6 (1983) (contrasting economic regulation and risk regulation (which the 
author refers to as “social regulation,” a designation that underscores the broad sweep 
of risk regulatory regimes)). 
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family;154 others place them outside.155  The demarcation lines between 
traditional economic regulation and modern risk regulation are 
anything but bright.  Contributing to the muddle, some authors simply 
use “risk regulation” as shorthand for the environmental, health, and 
safety regulatory regimes that gave rise to the term, with no attempt 
made to distinguish between regulatory systems’ normative precepts or 
design-related mechanics.156  Bearing this caveat in mind, the essential 
attribute of a new and distinct model of risk regulation emerges more 
clearly: risk regulation requires regulators to exercise their discretion 
in settings where scientific uncertainty is unavoidable.157 
In order to appreciate the distinctive attributes of this new risk 
state and how it deals with the scientific uncertainty problem, it is 
necessary to examine its legal-institutional structure in more concrete 
detail.  Shapiro and Glicksman identify two essential features of risk 
regulatory programs.158  First, the legislature designs a statutory trigger 
that permits an agency to act on the basis of anticipated harm.  Second, 
the legislature assigns the agency a statutory standard specifying the level 
or stringency with which it should regulate the harm and the factors it 
may consider in doing so.  Fisher expresses the same idea in slightly 
different terms: debates about risk regulation are about how to evaluate 
risk, a task that requires risk appraisal and standard setting.159  Thus, for 
instance, a statutory trigger might, as in the Clean Air Act, require that 
the regulator demonstrate that the public or environment is exposed 
to a risk factor (e.g., airborne pollution) at a level that is potentially 
dangerous before a regulatory intervention is legally permissible.160  As 
 
 154  See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 23–26 (1982) (including 
in a general discussion of regulation objectives the mitigation of “spillover” effects of 
otherwise private activity); MELNICK, supra note 153, at 5–6 (stating that the “purpose 
of recent [risk] regulation” is to reduce risks created by, among other things, 
“externalities”).  
 155  See, e.g., Omarova, supra note 152, at 81–82 (distinguishing on normative 
grounds “the familiar objective of eliminating specific inefficiencies that distort market 
dynamics” (which the author calls “economic regulation”) and “the more fundamental 
problems posed by the increasing complexity and interconnectedness in the financial 
system” (which the author analogizes to risk regulation)). 
 156  See Black, supra note 148, at 305 (making this point, not contributing to the 
muddle).  
 157  See SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS POLICYMAKERS 50 
(1990); Sidney A. Shapiro, OMB and the Politicization of Risk Assessment, 37 ENVTL L. 
1083, 1087 (2007) (noting that Congress intended for risk regulators to “make 
regulatory decisions on the basis of imperfect scientific knowledge”) (citations 
omitted).  
 158  See SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 151, at 31–45.  
 159  ELIZABETH FISHER, RISK REGULATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 6–
7 (2007).  
 160  See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A) (2012) (“The Administrator shall . . . publish . . . 
a list of categories of stationary sources [of pollution].  He shall include a category of 
sources in such list if in his judgment it causes, or contributes significantly to, air 
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for the statutory standard, a legislature might instruct the regulator to 
require firms to use the “best available technology” or adopt a 
particular corporate best practice “to the extent feasible.”161  
Alternatively, the legislature might adopt a more restrictive standard, 
requiring a risk regulator to demonstrate that the expected benefits of 
a regulation exceed its costs.162  Inevitably, the regulatory process 
requires some recourse to science and statistical data, and a wide range 
of opinions exist with respect to how this information is best integrated 
into the regulatory process.163  A full exploration of these issues is 
outside the scope of this Article, but it suffices to say for now that these 
intramural conflicts are nowhere close to being resolved.164 
The relevance of the risk regulation literature to the informal-
discretionary dimension of bank supervision should be apparent.  In 
both settings, the regulatory task requires the regulator to determine 
whether a statutory trigger test has been met by referring to an 
assessment of the risk that a future, uncertain outcome will transpire.  
Moreover, both settings also necessitate a trade-off, guided by the 
statutory standard, between protection against risks and the costs of 
providing that protection.165 
So what explains the historical disinclination on the part of legal 
scholars studying financial regulation to appreciate the relevance of 
the rich risk regulation literature—especially when the robust debate 
is occurring just down the hallway in the offices of their environmental 
law and administrative law colleagues?  Some care should be taken not 
to paint with too broad a brush; some commentators have perceptively 
flagged the similarities between risk regulation and financial 
regulation.  Perhaps in recognition of the trenchant association of risk 
regulation with environmental, health, and safety regulation,166 they 
have done so cautiously, pointing out that to date financial regulation 
has not yet been admitted to the club.167  In any event, so far the idea 
 
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”) 
(emphasis added).  
 161  See SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 151, at 38.  
 162  See id. at 39–40.  
 163  See Martin Kusch, Toward a Political Philosophy of Risk: Experts and Publics in 
Deliberative Democracy, in RISK: PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 131, 133–39 (Tim Lewens 
ed., 2007) (contrasting Cass Sunstein’s enthusiasm for quantitative, technocratic cost-
benefit analysis with Sheila Jasanoff’s skepticism of technical scientific experts in the 
regulatory process). 
 164  But cf. Fisher, supra note 141, at 128 (lamenting that “the risk assessment/risk 
management framework,” which relies heavily on technocratic cost-benefit analysis in 
the assessment stage, “has become the dominant account of risk regulation”).  
 165  See SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 151, at 21; Clayton P. Gillette & James E. 
Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1027, 1028 n.2 (1990) (“The 
objective . . . is to minimize the sum of the costs of risk and the costs of avoiding risk.”).  
 166  See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
 167  See Robert B. Ahdieh, Reanalyzing Cost-Benefit Analysis: Toward a Framework of 
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that risk regulation is really about protecting health, safety, and the 
environment—and, by implication, not about financial regulation—
has proven sticky. 
In a sense, this phenomenon is counterintuitive.  After all, 
financial regulators have been regulating risk and supervising risk-
creating, risk-taking, risk-profiting institutions since well before the 
1960s and 1970s.168  There are lexical and institutional explanations for 
the lack of communication between the financial regulation and risk 
regulation camps that still require significant exploration from both 
risk regulation and financial regulation scholars.  Future research will 
undoubtedly advance our understanding of how the informal-
discretionary mode of banking supervision fits into risk regulatory 
theory more broadly, but for present purposes the important point is 
to register how this particular corner of financial regulation resonates 
in perhaps unexpected ways with well-established traditions in other 
administrative law settings. 
D.  A Hypothetical Example: Hipobank’s Ukrainian Operations 
To better understand the advantages of the forward-looking 
orientation of the informal-discretionary mode of banking supervision, 
consider how the rigid PCA regime is ill equipped to address the 
following hypothetical scenario.  Imagine that a large, federally 
chartered bank named HipoBank, in response to retrenchment from 
its competitors, significantly ramps up its syndicated loan operations 
(through its Moscow, London, and Kiev branches) for large and mid-
sized Russian and Ukrainian corporate clients, despite the unrest in 
those nations.  HipoBank has historically had strong relationships with 
Russian clients, due to it being one of the most active Western banks 
to underwrite, through its London branch office, initial public 
offerings of privatized assets following the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
Furthermore, HipoBank’s risk managers are under the impression that 
its competitors are overestimating the political risk and war risk of 
lending operations in Russia and the Ukraine, and they believe that 
the conflict will resolve itself shortly and without further violence.169  
 
Function(s) and Form(s), 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1983, 2048 (2013) (“At least in the 
conventional sense, meanwhile, the SEC is not a risk regulator.  Agencies such as the 
EPA, OSHA, NHTSA, and the like—with their focus on human health and safety—
have traditionally been thought to represent the universe of risk regulators.”); 
Omarova, supra note 152, at 80 n.75 (“U.S. banking law has strong elements of risk 
regulation, insofar as it seeks to prevent systemic effects of bank failure and to 
safeguard the federal deposit insurance fund.”).  See also FISHER, supra note 159, at 6 
(expressly mentioning financial regulation as an arena where risk regulatory principles 
could apply).  
 168  See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 169  The hypothetical will consider the effects of managerial judgment of political 
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Initially, the increased portfolio of Russian and Ukrainian loans—
forming part of HipoBank’s “Central and Eastern European 
Corporate,” or “CEEC,” unit—performs well, and lower competition 
results in higher interest rates.  The decision to take on more CEEC 
business, in short, results in handsome profits for the unit and the bank 
at large. 
What are bank supervisors170 to do if they believe the risk from 
Ukrainian and Russian corporate loans is much higher than the bank 
believes—so much so that the solvency of the bank and the stability of 
the holding company might be threatened?  What if regulators 
determine that payment of the normal dividend to bank stockholders 
would deprive the bank of the added capital cushion that the 
supervisor believes the bank should maintain to protect itself against 
unexpected CEEC losses?171  The problem is that until the risk—here, 
a political risk or war risk associated with the conflict in the Ukraine—
has materialized and resulted in losses, it will not affect the accounting 
and payments systems to which the PCA regime and other dividend 
regulations are calibrated.  In other words, it will not raise any red flags 
along the formal-mandatory dimension of bank supervision.  In fact, if 
anything, the build-up of Ukraine risk will result in lowered supervisory 
surveillance, inasmuch as the enhanced profits, in the short term, will 
boost CEEC results and make the bank appear on more solid footing 
than before the decision to expand that portfolio.172  Turning to the 
initial question, what is a supervisor to do in such circumstances?  Can 
the supervisor order the bank to suspend or reduce its normal 
dividend or otherwise reduce its distributions to stockholders in order 
to preserve capital to hold against what the supervisor anticipates to be 
an impending rash of CEEC loan losses? 
 
and war risk, but not of sanctions-related liabilities or risks.   
 170  In this fictional case of HipoBank, the relevant supervisors would be the OCC 
(as the primary supervisor of HipoBank itself) and the FRB (as the supervisor of 
HipoBank’s holding company). 
 171  The supervisor obviously expects the CEEC business will result in losses, so in a 
colloquial sense it might seem incongruous to describe such losses as unexpected.  But 
in financial accounting parlance, expected losses result in loan loss provisions (also 
known as “valuation reserves”), which reduce earnings on the income statement and 
assets on the balance sheet, in turn resulting in reduced capital (which, after all, 
represents the difference between the now-reduced assets and the static liabilities).  See 
JOHN DOWNS & JORDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT 
TERMS 775 (7th ed. 2006) [hereinafter FINANCE DICTIONARY].  If the bank has not 
established a loan loss provision, the loss is not described as “expected.” 
 172  In particular, the increased profitability of the CEEC unit will result in increased 
earnings or income, which in turn will increase retained earnings and, eventually, 
capital.  See infra note 184 (discussing tendency of some commentators to view safety 
and soundness through the lens of profitability).  This analysis assumes that the CEEC 
profits are not distributed to stockholders as dividends or used to repurchase 
outstanding shares of stock of HipoBank or its holding company. 
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The preliminary answer is deceptively simple: remember that the 
supervisors wield the power to issue a cease-and-desist order on 
regulated banks engaging in practices the supervisor has determined 
to be “unsafe or unsound.”173  By designating aspects of the CEEC 
business, as presently conducted, as unsafe and unsound practices, 
supervisors could take any number of actions, including ordering 
Hipobank to hedge its Ukraine and Russia exposures, cease 
origination of new loans, or even divest its CEEC business altogether.174  
Of course, they could also issue a cease-and-desist order mandating 
that it suspend any dividend payments.  And their arsenal is not limited 
to cease-and-desist orders.  Supervisors could also order the removal of 
(and lifetime industry bans for) bank management or directors under 
Section 8(e) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act.175  They could even 
withdraw federal deposit insurance,176 which would likely precipitate a 
run on the bank that would result in the bank’s conservatorship.177 
When deliberating on whether a practice is unsafe or unsound, 
supervisors must take into account how current business practices might 
result in losses in a contingent future world state.  The inquiry is 
conjectural and counterfactual, and radically different than the 
mechanical inquiries of the formal-mandatory dimension, which rely 
on accounting metrics.  In this example, the supervisor must ask itself 
“what might go wrong here, and how severe might the consequences be 
 
 173  See supra note 78 and accompanying text (introducing authority to issue cease 
and desist orders). 
 174  The cease-and-desist order could take the form of a temporary restraining order 
issued before a hearing takes place.  See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(c) (2012).  
 175  See § 1818(e).  The Section 8(e) action would impose a higher burden of proof 
on the supervisors, who must prove that the institution-affiliated party engaged in 
personal dishonesty or acted with willful disregard for the safety and soundness of the 
bank.  See supra note 116 (introducing Section 8(e) actions). 
 176  See § 1818(a) (empowering the FDIC to initiate process for withdrawal of its 
deposit insurance where agency finds that “an insured depository institution or the 
directors or trustees of an insured depository institution have engaged or are engaging 
in unsafe or unsound practices in conducting the business of the depository 
institution”).  In practice, withdrawal of deposit insurance would only be deployed as 
a sanction for small and mid-sized banks.  While the FDIC is keen to avoid recourse to 
its deposit insurance fund, a run on a large bank could lead to a crisis in confidence, 
further bank failures, and far greater depletion of the insurance fund.  Cf. GARTEN, 
supra note 20, at 41 (“Although the regulators could commence a proceeding to 
terminate a bank’s deposit insurance, this power was not likely to be used.”). 
 177  See Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and 
Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401 (1983) (demonstrating importance of deposit insurance 
to prevention of runs on compromised banks).  Such a run would follow Gresham’s 
Law, which states that when there are two forms of money (in this case, insured 
deposits and uninsured deposits), the overvalued bad money drives out the good 
money.  See FINANCE DICTIONARY, supra note 171, at 297.  Legally fixed parity does not 
convince money users that the value of two different instruments is the same.  Savers 
hoard the good money (in this case, the insured deposits), and rush to circulate, or 
otherwise convert, the bad money (in this case, the newly uninsured deposits). 
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if such outcomes were to materialize?”  Given the potential severity of 
the sanction—e.g., a government agency ordering a bank not to pay 
dividends to its stockholders178—the power to designate a business 
practice as unsafe or unsound might be thought to raise due process 
concerns.  But courts have consistently rejected due process challenges 
to bank supervisory safety and soundness actions, reasoning that 
Congress put in place a scheme for aggrieved parties to seek redress 
both within the agency and, if necessary, the courts.179 
Indeed, the courts have approved broad and indeterminate 
agency interpretations of the scope of unsafe and unsound practices.  
As mentioned earlier, they have largely ratified the open-ended 
interpretation of “unsafe and unsound practices” proffered by 
Chairman Horne in his 1966 Congressional testimony—that is, a bank 
action or inaction is unsafe or unsound if “it is contrary to generally 
accepted standards of prudent operation” and if its “possible 
consequences . . . if continued” would include “abnormal risk or loss 
or damage to an institution, its shareholders, or the agenc[y] 
administering the [FDIC] insurance fund.”180  The D.C. Circuit has 
held that an “unsafe or unsound practice” is one that poses a 
“reasonably foreseeable [and] undue risk to the institution.”181  The 
Third Circuit, again picking up on Horne’s language, ruled that an 
“imprudent act . . . posing an abnormal risk to the financial stability of 
the banking institution would qualify” as an unsafe or unsound 
practice.182  The Ninth Circuit has stated explicitly what is implicit from 
Horne’s definition: namely, that a bank need not even be insolvent for 
its supervisor to initiate proceedings on safety and soundness 
grounds.183 
 
 178  See supra note 78 and accompanying text (discussing supervisory authority to 
issue cease and desist orders). 
 179  See Seidman v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 37 F.3d 911 (3d Cir. 1993) (rejecting 
due process challenge to OTS Section 8(e) removal order alleging that the same 
agency—indeed, the same individual—was acting as investigator, prosecutor, and 
adjudicator of charges based on unsafe and unsound practices); Nw. Nat’l Bank v. 
United States, 917 F.2d 1111, 1119 (8th Cir. 1990) (rejecting due process challenge of 
OCC decision to pursue cease and desist order to discipline bank management for 
unsafe and unsound practices instead of Section 8(e) removal order, which required 
a higher standard of proof); Hoffman v. Fed. Dep. Ins. Corp., 912 F.2d 1172, 1175 (9th 
Cir. 1990) (rejecting bank’s argument that due process required FDIC to demonstrate 
the bank was insolvent before entering order withdrawing deposit insurance on 
account of an unsafe and unsound practice). 
 180  Horne Testimony, supra note 80; see also supra note 81 (citing cases ratifying 
Horne’s interpretation). 
 181  Kaplan v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 104 F.3d 417, 421 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997). 
 182  See Seidman, 37 F.3d at 928. 
 183  Hoffman, 912 F.2d at 1175.  
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Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit clarified in Landry v. FDIC in 2000 
that it is no defense that the imprudent actions did not ultimately 
result in losses to the bank.184  In that case, the FDIC brought a Section 
8(e) removal order against a bank executive for self-dealing activities 
that exposed a bank185—and, in the process, the FDIC in its capacity as 
guarantor of most of the bank’s liabilities—to “abnormal risks,” 
including “at least one large loan to an uncreditworthy out-of-territory 
borrower, long-term contracts with consultants whose fees were 
proportionately greater than the services rendered, and the use of 
[b]ank funds for travel and related expenses in pursuit of 
breathtakingly irresponsible schemes.”186  The defendant argued that 
the FDIC erred in finding that the practices were unsafe or unsound 
because, whatever the risks might have been, the bank was profitable 
throughout the period in question.187  The court retorted that its 
inquiry was risk-focused, not outcome-focused; where a bank takes an 
imprudent action that results in reasonably foreseeable abnormal risks 
to the institution, a supervisor is authorized to make an unsafe and 
unsound practice finding.188  Again, the question is what might happen 
(or what might have happened had things turned out otherwise), not 
what did happen.  The contrast with dividend regulation and the PCA 
regime, as traditionally conceived, could not be starker. 
Viewing dividend regulation through these formal-mandatory 
and informal-discretionary lenses reveals a troubling state of affairs.  
On the one hand, the formal-mandatory tools have become largely 
obsolete.  On the other hand, regulators exhibit hesitancy, even 
unwillingness, to use informal-discretionary tools to limit bank 
dividends.  More troublingly, these patterns are generalizable beyond 
dividend regulation.  But dividend regulation is where the FRB has 
created a possible solution to the problem.  Its new CCAR program is 
both rigid and forward-looking.  It allows regulators to consider the 
effects of future hypothetical scenarios on a bank, but also tethers 
 
 184  Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2000).  This is an important 
clarification, as many commentators view safety and soundness through the lens of 
profit and loss.  Cf. Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. 
L. REV. 101, 190 (2008) (“[Federal bank supervisory] agencies are designed with a 
primary mission to protect the safety and soundness of the banking system.  This means 
protecting banks’ profitability.”).  According to this view, practices are safe and sound 
if they increase a bank’s earnings, which can only increase, and never decrease, a 
bank’s capital.  The Landry court ratifies the bank supervisory agencies’ view that the 
nature of risk requires that accounting profits alone cannot be the touchstone of safety 
and soundness. 
 185  See supra note 175 and accompanying text (explaining supervisory power to 
issue Section 8(e) removal orders). 
 186  Landry, 204 F.3d at 1138. 
 187  Id. 
 188  See id. (“Just as a loss, without more, does not prove that an act posed an 
abnormal risk, a profit does not establish its absence.”) (citations omitted). 
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those scenarios to a system of rigid numerical trigger points that 
require intervention by regulators.  This latter point is important 
because it is a potential antidote to regulators’ historical tendency 
towards inaction based on what they perceive to be future, conjectural 
risks of loss. 
VI. INTRODUCING THE COMPREHENSIVE CAPITAL ANALYSIS AND 
REVIEW 
The new CCAR regulatory initiative represents the most sweeping 
governmental intervention into bank dividend and distribution policy 
to date.  It is also noteworthy because it unites, for the first time, the 
forward-looking, counterfactual analysis of the informal-discretionary 
dimension of bank supervision with the precise, outcome-focused 
orientation of the formal-mandatory dimension.  In the process, it has 
supplanted the PCA regime as the primary lever of governmental 
power over U.S. banks and their holding companies.  FRB Governor 
Daniel Tarullo has stated that the combination of the CCAR program 
and the mandatory stress testing program constitutes a “building out” 
of a “more dynamic, more macroprudential, and more data-driven” 
bank regulatory framework.189  He might also have added that 
supervisors have performed a volte-face and turned their gaze from the 
past towards the future, without jettisoning the precise accounting 
metrics on which regimes like the PCA depend. 
With this new regulatory program, the FRB now (1) requires 
banks to consider the effects of hypothetical stress test scenarios on 
their balance sheets and (2) makes banks’ ability to distribute 
corporate property to their stockholders (including, most obviously, 
by paying dividends) contingent on banks having in place a sufficient 
capital cushion to withstand the stress scenarios.  As a result, the ability 
of banks to make capital distributions—the most basic method by 
which equity investors obtain returns on their investment—has been 
made contingent and contestable to an unprecedented degree. 
A. Mechanics of the CCAR Program 
For all its importance and novelty, the CCAR program is really an 
add-on to the FRB’s stress testing initiatives.  Since 2011, the Dodd-
Frank Act has required the FRB to conduct annual stress tests of bank 
holding companies with total consolidated assets greater than fifty 
billion dollars and of financial institutions designated by the Financial 
 
 189  Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks 
at the Federal Reserve Third Annual Stress Test Modeling Symposium, Boston, 
Massachusetts: Stress Testing after Five Years 1 (June 25, 2014) [hereinafter Tarullo 
Remarks] (transcript available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ 
speech/tarullo20140625a.pdf).  
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Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) as systemically important.190  The 
FRB implemented this DFAST191 stress testing mandate as part of its 
new Regulation YY, which consists of a suite of enhanced prudential 
requirements applicable to such large financial organizations.  Subpart 
E of Regulation YY sets forth the administrative details of the DFAST 
tests and labels companies subject to the testing requirements as 
“covered companies.”192  The DFAST program projects revenues, 
expenses, losses, and the resulting post-stress capital ratios based on 
three hypothetical scenarios of increasing degrees of stress severity: a 
baseline scenario, an adverse scenario, and a severely adverse 
scenario.193  By measuring the capital ratios, it functions as a sort of 
hypothetical PCA regime, but in a purely diagnostic capacity; the 
DFAST stress tests themselves have no coercive or prescriptive 
consequences. 
Congress elected to commit matters of stress scenario design 
entirely to the supervisors’ discretion.194  In implementing the DFAST 
program, the FRB has announced that its severely adverse scenarios 
will contain macroeconomic (i.e., economy-wide) and microeconomic 
(i.e., institution-specific) assumptions.  As a macroeconomic matter, 
the severely adverse scenario is designed to reflect, at a minimum, the 
economic and financial conditions typical of a severe recession.195  A 
microeconomic scenario might involve a default by the covered 
company’s most significant counterparty.196  The FRB has also 
announced that its severely adverse scenario will include a “market 
shock” to the portfolios of covered companies with large trading 
exposures.197  The FRB then applies the scenarios in a rigid and 
uniform manner to all covered companies to see how they would 
 
 190  12 U.S.C. § 5365(a) & (i)(1) (2012).  The institutions subject to these tests are 
also required to conduct their own internal stress tests based on (i) the FRB-designed 
scenarios and (ii) an additional internally-designed scenario.  See Weber, supra note 
12, at 2292–93. 
 191  The DFAST designation refers to Dodd-Frank Act Stress Tests.  See supra note 
12 and accompanying text. 
 192  12 C.F.R. § 252.42(f) (2015). 
 193  Id.; BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., DODD-FRANK ACT STRESS TEST 
2013: SUPERVISORY STRESS TEST METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 2 (2013), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/dfast_2013_results_201303
14.pdf [hereinafter 2013 DFAST RESULTS]. 
 194  See 12 U.S.C. § 5365(i) (requiring the FRB to conduct supervisory stress tests 
but not setting forth any guidance or requirements with respect to scenario design). 
 195  Policy Statement on the Scenario Design Framework for Stress Testing, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 71,435, 71,443 (Nov. 29, 2013), available at www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-11-
29/pdf/2013-27009.pdf. 
 196  See id. at 71,442. 
 197  See id. at 71,442–43. 
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respond in the event the scenarios in fact materialized.198  Specifically, 
the FRB requests specific data sets from the covered companies.  The 
FRB then projects revenues, expenses, losses, and capital ratios by 
inputting the requested data into the FRB’s own mathematical 
models.199 
The DFAST results grow teeth when they are combined with the 
subsequent CCAR program, pursuant to which the FRB requires each 
covered company to submit an annual capital plan to the FRB.200  
Recognizing that the DFAST and CCAR programs together constitute 
the most significant supervisory reform at least  since  the  1991 PCA  
reform,  the  FRB  has  been  careful  to legitimate these programs by 
pointing to the sources of authority pursuant to which they were 
undertaken.  In its final rule for the CCAR program, the FRB invoked 
its longstanding expectation—occasionally emphasized but rarely 
enforced—that bank holding companies operate with capital positions 
well in excess of those set forth in the PCA rules.201  The FRB also cited 
a Dodd-Frank Act mandate that the FRB identify, measure, and 
monitor risks to financial stability, and impose heightened prudential 
standards on large bank holding companies.202  Furthermore, Section 
166 of the Dodd-Frank Act provided an important statutory 
authorization for the CCAR program.203  That section instructs the FRB 
to “prescribe regulations establishing requirements to provide for the 
early remediation of financial distress” at a covered company.204  Like 
PCA, Section 166 contemplated ratcheted supervisory measures that 
“increase in stringency as the financial condition of the [covered] 
company declines”—including, most importantly for present 
purposes, “limits on capital distributions.”205  But unlike PCA, Section 
166 authorizes the FRB to calibrate its supervisory measures not only 
 
 198  2013 DFAST RESULTS, supra note 193, at 3. 
 199  See id. at 1. 
 200  Capital Plans, 76 Fed. Reg. 74,631, 74,633–34 (Dec. 1, 2011) (codified at 12 
C.F.R. § 225.8 (2015)) [hereinafter Capital Plans]. 
 201  Id. at 74,632. 
 202  Id. 
 203  See id. 
 204  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 166, 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5366 (2012). 
 205  § 166(c)(2)(A).  In a report to Congress mandated by Section 202(g)(4) of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, the Treasury Department noted the similarities between the FRB’s 
new Section 166 responsibilities and the PCA regime.  DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT 
TO THE CONGRESS ON PROMPT CORRECTIVE ACTION 6 (2012), available at http:// 
www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/studies-reports/Documents/FSOC%20PCA%20 
Report%20FINAL.pdf (“Importantly, section 166 requires the FRB to include liquidity 
measures, and other forward-looking indicators in addition to regulatory capital in the 
early remediation framework.  While section 166 and the PCA framework are separate, 
implementation of new rules under section 166 could provide regulators with 
additional experience to inform potential modifications to the PCA framework.”). 
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to actual and current regulatory capital ratios, but also to “other 
forward-looking indicators.”206  Here, Congress seems to invite bank 
supervisors, with express statutory language, to experiment with 
informal-discretionary initiatives styled after risk regulation programs. 
Whatever its statutory authorization, the historical genesis of the 
CCAR program can be traced to the FRB’s 2009 Supervisory Capital 
Assessment Program (SCAP), an ad hoc program consisting of a series 
of publicly disclosed stress tests to assess capital adequacy of large 
banking organizations.207  The SCAP did not require banks to describe 
their dividend plans (in part because nearly all banks had significantly 
cut back dividends in response to the financial crisis), although it did 
require banks to accept capital directly from the U.S. Treasury if they 
failed to demonstrate that they had sufficient capital to support 
lending in the stress scenarios.208  In 2011, the FRB conducted its first 
review of planned capital distributions in light of stress scenarios, in a 
program that, for the first time, bore the CCAR name.209  With this ad 
hoc 2011 exercise, the FRB assessed, on a prospective basis, the capital 
adequacy and the internal capital planning processes of the nineteen 
largest bank holding companies.  The nineteen banks subject to this 
exercise were the same banks subject to the 2009 SCAP program.210 
Shortly thereafter, in December of 2011, the FRB promulgated a 
final rule, entitled “Capital Plans” (the Capital Plans rule, or the 
Capital Plans program), requiring all covered companies to submit an 
annual capital plan to the FRB.211  This new rule transformed these 
initially ad hoc assessments of capital adequacy and capital planning 
practices into a regular feature of the supervisory regime for this new 
class of covered companiesthat is, all large bank holding companies 
(not just those who had participated in the 2009 SCAP exercise) and 
 
 206  § 166(c)(1). 
 207  See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., COMPREHENSIVE CAPITAL 
ANALYSIS AND REVIEW 2012: METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS FOR STRESS SCENARIO 
PROJECTIONS 4 (2012), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ 
press/bcreg/bcreg20120313a1.pdf [hereinafter 2012 CCAR RESULTS] (noting that the 
bank holding companies subject to the first CCAR were “the same institutions that 
participated in the 2009 [SCAP] [p]rogram”); Timothy Geithner, How We Tested the Big 
Banks, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2009, at A33 (explaining the SCAP stress test exercise). 
 208  See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE SUPERVISORY CAPITAL 
ASSESSMENT PROGRAM: DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 2 (2009), available at http:// 
www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/bcreg20090424a1.pdf. 
 209  See BD. OF GOVERNORS  OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., COMPREHENSIVE CAPITAL 
ANALYSIS AND REVIEW: OBJECTIVES AND OVERVIEW (2011), available at http:// 
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20110318a1.pdf [hereinafter 
2011 CCAR RESULTS].   
 210  See supra note 207 and accompanying text (introducing the 2009 SCAP 
program). 
 211  See supra note 200 and accompanying text. 
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companies the FSOC designates as their equivalents.212  In 2014, the 
FRB combined the ad hoc CCAR program and the new, regular Capital 
Plans program into a single program bearing the CCAR name, but now 
backed by the express authority of a full-blown notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.213  Consequently, today there is no difference between the 
 
 212  See supra notes 190 & 192 and accompanying text (discussing (1) the FSOC’s 
authority to designate companies as systemically important and to subject those 
companies to heightened FRB supervision, including the DFAST and CCAR programs 
and (2) the new designation “covered company” that the FRB uses to refer to 
companies subject to those programs). 
 213  For such young programs, the history of the SCAP program, the CCAR 
program, the DFAST program, and the Capital Plans program is nothing short of 
byzantine.  For example, one might reasonably wonder why the FRB continued to 
conduct the CCAR program at all in 2012 and 2013—i.e., after the Capital Plans 
program, which applied to all the institutions subject to the CCAR, had already 
become law in December of 2011.  On that score, it bears reminding that the FRB had 
been operating the CCAR program since before the Capital Plans rule came into 
existence.  See 2011 CCAR RESULTS, supra note 209 (dated March 2011, several months 
before the FRB promulgated the final Capital Plans rule in December of 2011).  In 
2012, the first year in which the Capital Plans rule applied, the CCAR and the Capital 
Plans program were largely identical in their mechanical details.  The innovative 
aspects of the latter program were twofold: on the one hand, its scope was wider; and 
on the other hand, it formalized the 2011 CCAR process via rulemaking.  As for the 
new scope, the class of “covered companies” subject to the Capital Plans program was 
wider than the class of companies subject to the CCAR, the terms of which applied 
only to those companies subject to the initial 2009 SCAP program.  See 2012 CCAR 
RESULTS, supra note 207, at 4.  This discrepancy arose because the CCAR program 
incorporated the DFAST supervisory stress tests, which the FRB did not apply to non-
SCAP institutions until the stress test cycle commencing on October 1, 2013—i.e., in 
connection with the 2014 CCAR program.  See 12 C.F.R. § 252.133(a) (2013).  
Accordingly, the FRB conducted the 2012 and 2013 Capital Plans programs for only 
the eleven covered companies that had not been subject to the SCAP program and, by 
implication, were no subject to the CCAR program.  See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. 
RESERVE SYS., COMPREHENSIVE CAPITAL ANALYSIS AND REVIEW 2013: ASSESSMENT 
FRAMEWORK AND RESULTS 10 (2013), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
bankinforeg/ccar-2013-results-20130314.pdf [hereinafter 2013 CCAR RESULTS]; 2012 
CCAR RESULTS, supra note 207, at 7.  The 2011, 2012, and 2013 CCAR programs 
applied to the initial SCAP covered companies (nineteen in 2012, but only eighteen 
in 2013 because MetLife, Inc. de-registered as a bank holding company).  In each of 
the CCAR programs that the FRB conducted after it had finalized the Capital Plans 
rule, it expressly invoked the Capital Plans rule as authority for the CCAR program.  
See, e.g., 2014 CCAR RESULTS, supra note 13, at 1 (“Pursuant to the capital plan rule, 
each [covered company] with total consolidated assets of fifty billion dollars or more 
is required to submit a capital plan approved by the [covered company’s] board of 
directors, or a committee thereof, for the Federal Reserve’s annual CCAR.”).  By that 
point, the Capital Plans rule had, unlike the CCAR program, become a final rule 
following a full notice-and-comment rulemaking.  The only technical difference 
between the CCAR program (which incorporated the DFAST stress tests) and the pre-
2014 Capital Plans program is that with the latter, the FRB did not conduct a 
supervisory stress test on its own, as it was required to do in connection with the DFAST 
stress test program that was incorporated into the CCAR program; instead, these 
covered companies conducted their own stress tests, based on the same DFAST 
scenarios, and reported the results, which, unlike the DFAST results, were not required 
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Capital Plans program and the CCAR program; this Article will refer 
to the rule from here on as the CCAR rule, in recognition of the FRB’s 
decision to do the same. 
In evaluating the capital plan, the FRB assesses whether the 
covered company has robust, forward-looking capital planning 
processes and sufficient capital to continue operations throughout 
times of economic and financial stress.214  Mandatory elements of a 
capital plan include: (1) an assessment of the expected uses and 
sources of capital over the planning horizon (at least nine quarters, 
beginning with the quarter preceding the quarter in which the covered 
company submits its capital plan) that reflects the covered company’s 
size, complexity, risk profile, and scope of operations, assuming both 
expected and stressful conditions; (2) a detailed description of the 
covered company’s process for assessing capital adequacy; (3) the 
covered company’s capital policy; and (4) a discussion of any expected 
changes to the covered company’s business plan that are likely to have 
a material impact on its capital adequacy or liquidity.215 
A linchpin of the CCAR program is the stress test component that 
requires each covered company to estimate projected revenues, losses, 
reserves, and pro forma capital levels under a range of stress 
scenarios.216  In its rule, the FRB has announced its intention that the 
CCAR stress scenarios will “be consistent with” the DFAST stress test 
scenarios.217  In practice, the FRB has utilized the exact DFAST stress 
test scenarios when conducting each of the CCAR exercises it has 
administered to date.218  The rule requires the capital plan to consider 
the effects of, in addition to the FRB-formulated stress scenarios, at 
least one stress scenario developed by the covered company itself.219 
 
to be publicly disclosed.  See 2013 CCAR RESULTS, supra, at 10; 2012 CCAR RESULTS, 
supra note 207, at 7.  As noted in the text, in 2014, the FRB merged the CCAR program 
and the Capital Plans program into a single, unitary CCAR program that applies in an 
identical manner to all covered companies—of which there were thirty in 2014.  See 
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., COMPREHENSIVE CAPITAL ANALYSIS AND 
REVIEW 2014: SUMMARY INSTRUCTIONS AND GUIDANCE 1–2 (2013), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20131101a2.pdf 
[hereinafter 2014 CCAR INSTRUCTIONS]; 2014 CCAR RESULTS, supra note 13, at 2 (“This 
year’s CCAR covered 30 large BHCs, including 12 BHCs that did not participate in 
previous CCAR exercises.”). 
 214  See Capital Plans, supra note 200, at 74,633. 
 215  Id. at 74,634.   
 216  Id. at 74,635. 
 217  Id.   
 218  In the 2013 and 2014 CCAR programs, the FRB adopted the DFAST stress 
scenarios in their entirety.  See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 
COMPREHENSIVE CAPITAL ANALYSIS AND REVIEW 2013: SUMMARY INSTRUCTIONS AND 
GUIDANCE 5 (2012), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/ 
bcreg20121109b1.pdf [hereinafter 2013 CCAR INSTRUCTIONS]; 2014 CCAR 
INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 213, at 7–8. 
 219  2014 CCAR INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 213, at 5. 
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After reviewing the capital plan, the FRB may approve the plan, 
reject the plan, or require re-submission of the plan.220  In coming to 
its decision, the FRB takes into account quantitative and qualitative 
considerations.221  FRB Governor Daniel Tarullo has described the 
qualitative inquiry as “cover[ing] a range of topics, including the extent 
to which the design of a firm’s internal scenario captures the specific 
risks from the firm’s activities, the firm’s methods for projecting losses 
under stress scenarios, and how the firm identifies appropriate capital 
levels and plans for distributions.”222  The principal quantitative grounds 
for disapproval of a capital plan are that a covered company fails to 
demonstrate its ability to maintain a minimum five-percent Tier 1 
common ratio223 or other mandatory levels of minimum regulatory 
capital224 under the stress test scenarios.225 
 
 220  Capital Plans, supra note 200, at 74,638–41; see also Policy Framework on the 
Scenario Design Framework for Stress Testing, 77 Fed. Reg. 70,124, 70,125 (2012) 
(noting that the CCAR program “ties the review of a bank holding company’s 
performance under stress scenarios to its ability to make capital distributions”).  The 
new CCAR rule makes a process analogous to the PCA regime’s “capital restoration 
plan” for “undercapitalized” banks an ongoing feature of banking supervision for all 
large banks.  See supra note 96 and accompanying text.  In this respect, it is also similar 
to the new requirement set forth in the Dodd-Frank Act that large banks present “living 
wills” for approval by bank supervisors.  In each of these cases, lawmakers have 
instituted periodic discursive events and settings in which regulatory processes can 
engage in continuous learning and adjust dynamically to changing circumstances and 
learned experience.  See JULIA BLACK, RULES AND REGULATORS 37–44 (1997) (touting 
virtues of a “conversational model of regulation”); William H. Simon, Optimization and 
Its Discontents in Regulatory Design: Bank Regulation as an Example, 4 REG. & GOVERNANCE 
3 (2010).  
 221  See 12 C.F.R. § 225.8(e)(2)(ii) (2013). 
 222  Tarullo Remarks, supra note 189, at 10–11.  
 223  The CCAR was the first bank regulatory initiative to use the concept of a Tier 1 
common capital ratio.  Tier 1 common capital is defined as Tier 1 capital less non-
common elements in Tier 1 capital, including perpetual preferred stock and related 
surplus, minority interest in subsidiaries, trust preferred securities and mandatory 
convertible preferred securities.  See Capital Plans, supra note 200, at 74,636.  In 
substance, this amounts to common stock plus retained earnings.  Since the FRB 
promulgated its CCAR rule, it has adopted the so-called “Basel III” capital adequacy 
framework, which introduced a new common equity Tier 1 definition.  See Regulations 
Y and YY: Application of the Revised Capital Framework to the Capital Plan and Stress 
Test Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 59,779, 59,779 (Sept. 13, 2013), available at 
http://www.gpo/gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-09-30/pdf/2013-23618/pdf.  The FRB 
anticipates that this new common equity Tier 1 will be even more stringent than the 
Tier 1 common ratio established by the CCAR.  See id. at 59,781. 
 224  The other minimum regulatory ratios required by the CCAR rule are the 
“common equity tier 1 capital ratio,” the “tier 1 risk-based capital ratio,” the “total risk-
based capital ratio,” and the “tier 1 leverage ratio.”  2014 CCAR INSTRUCTIONS, supra 
note 213, at 2. 
 225  2013 CCAR RESULTS, supra note 213, at 11.  On the DFAST stress test scenarios, 
see supra note 193 and accompanying text.  Although the focus of the review is the 
projected capital levels under the DFAST stress test scenarios, the FRB in its rule 
reserves the right to object to the plan even where the covered company is projected 
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If the FRB rejects the capital plan, the covered company is 
prohibited from engaging in any “capital distribution,” a category of 
transactions defined to include, most obviously, making dividend 
payments to stockholders or repurchasing stock.226  In such a case, the 
FRB requires the holding company to retain that capital, rather than 
distribute it to holding company stockholders.227  The prohibition stays 
in effect for four quarters.228  Consequently, the covered company 
becomes more resilient to perturbations in the financial markets, and 
the FRB might even require it to contribute capital downstream to its 
bank subsidiaries under the source-of-strength principle.229 
Since 2013, the FRB has given covered companies the opportunity 
to revise their proposed capital plans before receiving a final FRB 
objection, but such revisions may only include reductions in proposed 
dividends or other distributions.230  In any event, however, disapproval 
of a capital plan halts dividend payments.  If a covered company that 
is subject to a capital plan objection wishes to pay higher dividends in 
the future, it must wait until the following year, at which point it must 
be in a position to demonstrate, either by raising additional capital or 
otherwise, its ability to meet the quantitative and qualitative criteria of 
the review.231  The remedial actions available to the FRB are narrower 
than the remedial actions provided for by the PCA regime,232 but the 
 
to have stressed capital ratios that remain above regulatory minimum levels.  See 2012 
CCAR RESULTS, supra note 207, at 6. 
 226  For purposes of its CCAR rule, the FRB defines “capital distribution” as:  
[A] redemption or repurchase of any debt or equity capital instrument, 
a payment of common or preferred stock dividends, a payment that may 
be temporarily or permanently suspended by the issuer on any 
instrument that is eligible for inclusion in the numerator of any 
minimum regulatory capital ratio, and any similar transaction that the 
[FRB] determines to be in substance a distribution of capital.  
Capital Plans, supra note 200, at 74,637; see also 12 C.F.R. § 225.8(e)(2)(iv) (2015). 
 227  In the case of the covered companies subject to the CCAR program, the relevant 
stockholders are widely dispersed owners of publicly traded stock. 
 228  See 2013 CCAR RESULTS, supra note 213, at 4. 
 229  See supra notes 86 & 87 and accompanying text (summarizing the FRB’s source-
of-strength principle and its statutory authorization). 
 230  See 2013 CCAR RESULTS, supra note 213, at 4; 2013 CCAR INSTRUCTIONS, supra 
note 218, at 27. 
 231  A covered company failing in year one might be able to make such a 
demonstration in year two based on internal or external developments (or, more 
likely, some mixture of the two).  For instance, it could raise additional equity capital 
(raising additional debt capital would likely exacerbate any failure to satisfy the 
quantitative criteria) or it could reduce its balance sheet or offload assets with high 
risk weights.  On the other hand, market developments entirely external to the firm 
might result in increased reported values for covered company assets (or decreased 
loss provisions), such that the company would report higher capital ratios. 
 232  See supra note 94 (describing remedial actions available to bank supervisors as 
bank capital and leverage ratios fall). 
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power to restrict capital distributions is particularly meaningful, as it 
strikes at the basic value proposition of holding equity securities.233 
The critical point here is that whereas the PCA regime triggers 
intervention powers based on actual capitalization levels, the CCAR 
program triggers intervention powers based on consideration of 
hypothetical capitalization levels in the event the stress scenarios come 
to pass.234  In the words of the FRB, the new program “incorporates a 
forward-looking, post-stress evaluation of a [covered company’s] 
capital adequacy.”235 
Before these programs, bank regulators lacked a systematized way 
of tying dividend regulation to the informal-discretionary dimension 
of bank regulation.  Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, bank supervisors 
examined banks’ risk models and stress tests, but they consistently 
failed to require banks to change business practices or maintain 
additional capital to ensure reliable performance in contingent stress 
scenarios, despite their statutory authorities to do so.236  The director 
of the now-defunct Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) addressed this 
issue in Congressional testimony: “[a]ll of our institutions, all of our 
risk management practices, all of our examination approaches work 
well, but it is difficult to look at all the risk models and stress them to 
unprecedented degrees and then require institutions to operate within 
those stress models.”237 
Of course, supervisors could always designate any bank action or 
inaction uncovered during the examination process an “unsafe or 
unsound practice,” but prior to the CCAR program these 
determinations would have to be made on an ad hoc basis.  Now, the 
FRB has instituted a regular procedural mechanism to deliberate on, 
formulate, and take into account the effects of hypothetical stress 
scenarios on bank capital levels.  Moreover, the OTS director’s 
testimony alludes to another difficulty: with the largest banks, 
supervisors are hesitant to deploy their enforcement arsenal based on 
 
 233  See supra note 18 and accompanying text (explaining how all returns on equity 
depend, even if indirectly, on the prospect of payment of dividends to equity owners).  
 234  The impetus for this shift toward linking minimum capital standards to stress 
scenarios came from the Basel Committee’s so-called “Basel 2.5” enhancements in 
2009.  See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, ENHANCEMENTS TO THE BASEL II 
FRAMEWORK 25 (2009), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs157.pdf 
(“Supervisors should challenge banks on how stress testing is used and the way it affects 
decision-making.  Where this assessment reveals material shortcomings, supervisors should 
require a bank to detail a plan of corrective action.”) (emphasis added).  
 235  2013 CCAR RESULTS, supra note 213, at 1. 
 236  See supra notes 116, 173 & 174 and accompanying text. 
 237  Lessons Learned in Risk Management Oversight at Federal Financial Regulators: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., and Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and 
Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 25 (2009) (statement of Scott M. Polakoff, Acting Director, 
Office of Thrift Supervision), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
111shrg52966/pdf/CHRG-111shrg52966.pdf.  
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hypothetical scenarios.  As an illustration of this hesitancy, consider 
that none of the largest banks were the subject of any enforcement 
proceedings predicated on an unsafe or unsound practice finding in 
the five years leading up to the September 2008 financial crisis.238 
The novelty of the CCAR regime is not limited to its innovative 
combination of two formerly distinct modes of regulation, which is 
really an innovation in regulatory theory more than practice.  It will 
also have significant practical implications.  As a practical matter, it will 
eclipse the PCA regime as the first regulatory intervention point based 
on capital adequacy grounds for large banks.239  This prediction is 
straightforward because the stress scenario will necessarily result in a 
bank becoming insolvent earlier than it would in actual market 
conditions.  Unsurprisingly, bank holding companies have taken 
notice of the regulatory shift.  After all, it is a direct impediment to 
returning capital to their stockholders.  For all the controversy over 
whether managers and boards are responsive to stockholders, the 
pressure to pay dividends and engage in share repurchases is an 
incontrovertible fact of life for today’s public company.240 
Figure 2 below updates the earlier regulatory map by including 
the qualitative and quantitative elements of the CCAR program. 
 
 
 238  See supra note 126 and accompanying text (describing tendency for supervisors 
to avoid finding unsafe and unsound practices at the largest banks).  
 239  The “based on capital adequacy grounds” qualification is required to take 
account of the supervisors’ powers to issue cease-and-desist orders when a bank or 
bank holding company engages in an unsafe or unsound practice.  See supra note 114 
and accompanying text (describing supervisors’ authority to discipline banks and their 
executives and boards of directors on safety and soundness grounds even when the 
firm is adequately capitalized under the capital adequacy rules). 
 240 Compare Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 833, 901 (2005) (“At present, all decisions concerning distributions are in 
management’s hands.”), and Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate 
Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 323 (1986) (“Conflicts of interest 
between shareholders and managers over payout policies are especially severe when 
the organization generates substantial free cash flow.”), with LYNN STOUT, THE 
SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, 
CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 15–23 (2012) (chronicling the “rise of shareholder 
value thinking”), William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 
1375, 1415 (2007) (noting that “hedge funds also intervene on the financial side, 
pressuring firms to disgorge cash—either by substantially increasing a regular 
dividend, paying a special dividend, or repurchasing stock”), and William W. Bratton 
& Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 
685 (2010) (“Whether or not cash retention remains a serious governance problem, 
the cash-disgorgement agenda registered in boardrooms with unprecedented success 
during the later stages of the most recent bull market.”). 
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Figure 2:  Regulatory Map of U.S. Bank Dividend Regulations 
(including the CCAR program) 
 
 
 
This map reflects visually the point made throughout this Part VI: 
that the CCAR program combines elements of the informal-
discretionary quadrant with elements from the formal-mandatory 
quadrant in a new way.  The map also shows the qualitative component 
of the CCAR as an additional informal-discretionary tool.  It differs, 
however, from the other informal-discretionary regulatory initiatives 
appearing in that quadrant because it has been formalized as a 
periodic, recurring feature of bank supervision.  As such, it might be 
hypothesized that the FRB should utilize it more frequently than its 
historically underutilized safety-and-soundness authority.  The early 
returns on the qualitative component, discussed below, support this 
hypothesis. 
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B.  Early Experience of the CCAR Program 
The CCAR program has become one of the key pillars of the U.S. 
bank supervisory system.  Regulators and industry both acknowledge 
its novel importance, and boards of directors manage their companies’ 
affairs in its shadow.241  JPMorgan Chase & Co., the largest U.S. bank 
holding company, describes the new regulatory CCAR regime as the 
“primary measure [that it] use[s] to assess capital adequacy.”242  It 
further attributes the primacy of regulatory capital to the regulators’ 
powers to restrict capital distributions: “regulatory capital measures are 
the basis upon which the Federal Reserve objects or does not object to 
the Firm’s planned capital actions as set forth in the Firm’s CCAR 
submission.”243 
JPMorgan Chase’s concerns are not merely theoretic.  For the 
2012 CCAR,244 the FRB objected to the capital plans of four of nineteen 
covered companies subject to CCAR245: Ally Financial Inc., Citigroup 
Inc., SunTrust Banks, Inc., and MetLife, Inc.  Under the severely 
adverse stress scenario, the Tier 1 common capital levels246 for three 
companies would fall below the new 5.0% threshold if they effectuated 
the dividends and other capital distributions as proposed in their 
capital plans.  For Ally Financial, they would fall from actual levels of 
8.0% to 2.5%; for Citigroup, they would decline from 11.7% to 4.9%; 
and for SunTrust, they would decline from 9.3% to 4.8%.247  MetLife, 
Inc. would maintain Tier 1 common capital levels above 5.0%, but its 
Tier 1 leverage ratio would fall to 3.4%, below the regulatory minimum 
of 4.0%.248  In each of these cases, the FRB enjoined planned 
distributions of corporate funds to stockholders.249 
In 2013, the FRB enjoined proposed distributions for two of the 
eighteen covered companies subject to the CCAR program: Ally 
Financial Inc. and BB&T Corporation.  The FRB objected to the 
 
 241  See supra note 9 and accompanying text (reporting how Goldman Sachs cut back 
its repo lending program because of its preliminary 2014 CCAR results). 
 242  JPMorgan 10-K, supra note 8, at 117. 
 243  Id. 
 244  See supra note 213 and accompanying text (explaining that the CCAR program 
was the programmatic vehicle through which the FRB conducted the Capital Plans 
program for the largest bank holding companies, but that the Capital Plans program 
has since 2014 been subsumed into a now unitary CCAR program). 
 245  For an explanation for why only nineteen covered companies were subject to 
the CCAR program, see supra note 213. 
 246  See supra note 224 and accompanying text (listing minimum capital adequacy 
ratio requirements that must be met under the stress scenarios pursuant to the CCAR 
program). 
 247  2012 CCAR RESULTS, supra note 207, at 24.  
 248  Id. (noting MetLife, Inc.’s 3.4% leverage ratio); see also id. at 26 n.24.  
 249  See Peter Eavis & J.B. Silver-Greenberg, 15 of 19 Big Banks Pass Fed’s Latest Stress 
Test, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2012, at B1; 2012 CCAR RESULTS, supra note 207, at 24 tbl.2. 
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former’s plan on quantitative and qualitative grounds.250  In particular, 
in the severely adverse stress scenario, Ally Financial’s Tier 1 common 
equity ratio decreased from 7.33% to 1.78% after giving effect to its 
proposed distributions.251  In BB&T’s case, the FRB objected to the 
plan on qualitative reasons alone.252  These qualitative reasons related 
to BB&T’s public disclosure that it was reevaluating the process by 
which it calculated its risk-weighted assets—a key input for one of the 
regulatory capital levels tested in the CCAR program—to comply with 
applicable regulatory guidance concerning its treatment of unfunded 
lending commitments.253 
In each of these cases, the FRB objected to and enjoined 
dividends or other distributions of capital where the covered company 
was “well capitalized” according to each of the PCA regulatory capital 
requirements to which it was subject.254  The objection was premised 
on the covered company’s predicted inability to maintain its “well 
capitalized” status if a stress scenario were to occur.  With the CCAR 
program (and the DFAST stress tests it incorporates), the regulatory 
lens has shifted from snapshot assessments of actual capital levels to 
forward-looking assessments based on contingent, conjectural, and 
hypothetical future world states.  By limiting the ability to declare 
dividends or otherwise distribute corporate property—which, again, is 
the essential characteristic of a privately funded banking system255—the 
FRB has rendered bank dividends more contingent and contestable 
than ever before. 
The 2014 CCAR Results ushered in a new era for two reasons.  
First, the scope of the program expanded; thirty covered companies 
met the statutory threshold for participation,256 up from eighteen the 
year before.257  Second, the FRB significantly ramped up its 
enforcement efforts to discipline banks on qualitative grounds.  The 
FRB rejected the capital plans of four banks due to what the FRB 
determined were deficient corporate governance systems with respect 
to capital planning.  As for the quantitative component of the 
 
 250  On the FRB’s authority to object to a capital plan for qualitative or quantitative 
grounds, see supra note 221 and accompanying text. 
 251  2013 CCAR RESULTS, supra note 213, at 16. 
 252  Id. at 6. 
 253  Id. at 20. 
 254  For a discussion of the importance of the “well capitalized” definition to the 
prompt corrective action regime, see supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 255  See supra Part II (explaining importance of dividends to a privatized financial 
system).  
 256  All bank holding companies with assets in excess of fifty billion dollars, as well 
as all entities designated by the FSOC as systemically important, must participate in 
the CCAR program.  See supra notes 190 & 200 and accompanying text. 
 257  See 2014 CCAR RESULTS, supra note 13, at 2.  For a full discussion of the scope 
of application of the CCAR program, see supra note 213 and accompanying text. 
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program, the FRB continued to restrict dividend payments for banks 
failing to maintain requisite capital ratios over the severely adverse 
scenario. 
The FRB objected to four banks’ capital plans on qualitative 
grounds. The FRB’s most significant objection was that of Citigroup, 
which once again found itself the subject of an FRB objection.258  In 
objecting to Citigroup’s planned increase of its annual dividend from 
four cents to twenty cents,259 the FRB noted that, consistent with a 2012 
policy statement, it had heightened expectations of “financial 
resiliency”260 of the largest, most important financial institutions.261  
The FRB highlighted “deficiencies” in the bank’s abilities “to project 
revenue and losses under a stressful scenario for material parts of the 
firm’s global operations” and “to develop scenarios for its internal 
stress testing that adequately reflect and stress its full range of business 
activities and exposures.”262  The FRB noted that it had previously 
brought these deficiencies to Citigroup managers’ attention during its 
supervisory examinations of the holding company system.263 
The three other covered companies that received objections to 
their capital plans—Santander Holdings USA, Inc., RBS Citizens 
Financial Group, Inc., and HSBC North America Holdings Inc.—are 
the U.S. holding companies for banks headquartered outside of the 
United States.264  For RBS Citizens and HSBC, the FRB echoed its 
concerns with Citigroup.  These banks had deficient practices for 
estimating revenues and losses under a stress scenario; in the process, 
they failed to demonstrate their ability to plan for a recession.265  The 
FRB found that Santander’s problems ran deeper, describing the 
bank’s capital planning deficiencies as “widespread and significant.”266  
In fact, the FRB’s results for Santander lamented nearly every 
important aspect of its stress scenario planning: “governance, internal 
controls, risk identification and management, management 
 
 258  See supra note 247 and accompanying text (discussing the FRB’s rejection of 
Citigroup’s 2012 capital plan on quantitative grounds). 
 259  See Stephanie Armour et al., Fed Kills Citi Plan to Pay Investors, WALL ST. J., Mar. 
27, 2014, at A1 (reporting that Citigroup executives were surprised by the objection, 
and had believed the proposed dividend increase was “modest”). 
 260  BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., SR NO. 12-17, CONSOLIDATED 
SUPERVISION FRAMEWORK FOR LARGE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 4 (2012), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/srletters/sr1217.pdf. 
 261  2014 CCAR RESULTS, supra note 13, at 7. 
 262  Id. 
 263  Id. 
 264  See id. at 6. 
 265  Id. at 7. 
 266  Id. 
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information system[s], and assumptions and analysis that support [its] 
capital planning processes.”267 
Zions Bancorporation was the only bank to receive an objection 
on quantitative grounds in 2014.  Its Tier 1 common ratio for the 
severely adverse scenario was 4.4%, short of the 5.0% standard.  
Consistent with past practice, the FRB provided preliminary results of 
its CCAR exercise to the covered companies.  The Goldman Sachs 
Group Inc. and Bank of America Inc., two of the five largest U.S.-based 
bank holding companies,268 received preliminary word from the FRB 
that it would reject their capital plans on quantitative grounds if they 
were left unchanged.269  If those banks were to pay out dividends as 
proposed in their initial capital plan submissions, their leverage ratios 
would have fallen below the required minimum levels in the severely 
adverse scenario.  In response to the preliminary objection, Bank of 
America and Goldman pared back their planned distribution of 
dividends.270  In light of the close call, Goldman Sachs also elected to 
preserve its future flexibility and reduce its likelihood of receiving a 
future objection by shrinking its total assets.271  Here, the FRB 
demonstrated its ability to conceive of dividend regulation in less 
formal terms—as a dialogic and conversational regulatory model that 
occurs in the shadow of the FRB’s more prescriptive powers.272 
The conduct of the CCAR program over the past three years has 
reinvigorated dividend regulation—a largely forgotten feature of U.S. 
banking regulation, at least for the largest banks—and made it a salient 
component of the bank supervisory apparatus.  In administering the 
program, the FRB has restricted the ability of ten of the largest bank 
holding companies in the world to pay dividends to their 
 
 267  Id. 
 268  See Holding Companies with Assets Greater Than $10 Billion, NAT’L INFO. CTR., 
http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/HCSGreaterThan10B.aspx (last visited 
Oct. 2, 2015) (providing list of largest financial holding companies as of March 31, 
2014). 
 269  2014 CCAR RESULTS, supra note 13, at 9, 13 tbl.6.A, 32 tbl.A.4.A (noting in 
particular that under the severely adverse stress scenario, Goldman Sachs would see its 
Tier 1 leverage ratio drop to 3.9% (below the 4.0% standard) and Bank of America 
would see its Tier 1 leverage ratio fall to 3.9% and its Tier 1 capital ratio fall below the 
6.0% standard). 
 270  See Michael J. Moore & Elizabeth Dexheimer, Citigroup Fails Fed Stress Test as BofA 
Gets Dividend Boost, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Mar. 27, 2014, 12:55 PM), http:// 
www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-26/citigroup-fails-fed-stress-test-as-goldman-bofa-
modify-plans.html (“[Bank of America and Goldman Sachs] asked for too much in 
buybacks and dividends after their own internal stress tests showed better performance 
than in the central bank’s exam.”).  
 271  See supra note 9 and accompanying text (reporting how Goldman Sachs cut back 
its repo lending program because of its preliminary 2014 CCAR results).  See infra 
notes 27779 and accompanying text for a fuller discussion of how Bank of America 
and Goldman Sachs responded to the FRB’s 2014 preliminary objection. 
 272  See BLACK, supra note 220, at 37–44. 
WEBER (DO NOT DELETE) 10/24/2015  11:27 AM 
106 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:43 
stockholders.273  Moreover, by instituting the CCAR program as an 
ongoing feature of bank supervision, the FRB has formally made all 
large bank holding company dividends contingent on regulatory 
approval.  Although the FRB has possessed the authority—since 1966, 
at any rate274—to restrict dividends and other distributions where a 
bank or bank holding company is engaging in unsafe or unsound 
practices, this new program systematizes and formalizes this intrusion 
into the corporate governance of the banking sector.  Moreover, it 
does so without requiring the supervisor to demonstrate that the bank 
is engaging in an unsafe or unsound practice.  Instead, the regulatory 
intervention is predicated on a bank’s failure to demonstrate that its 
practices, however facially safe and sound, are sufficient to secure 
stable, continued, and resilient operation in the event that a stress 
scenario, formulated by the supervisors, were to transpire. 
The CCAR program affects the decisional landscape for covered 
companies in ways that extend well beyond dividend policy.  It also 
alters the ex ante incentive structure for covered company 
management.  Because boards and executives manage their firms in 
light of their expectations of the future, the CCAR program can force 
management into choosing between two strategy types.  These strategy 
types involve incremental trade-offs; that is, they are not mutually 
exclusive and can be contemporaneously adopted in combination to 
varying degrees.  The first strategy type is simple: management can 
adjust its planned dividends and distributions in recognition of the 
possible, or likely, rejection of its capital plan.  Under the second 
alternative, management can adjust its existing strategy by re-allocating 
asset portfolios or raising new capital, so as to maximize its chances of 
avoiding a rejection and preserving its ability to distribute capital to 
stockholders.  Any informal model of these decisional incentives must 
also take into consideration whether the FRB continues its practice of 
notifying covered companies preliminarily of its intent to object to a 
submitted plan, or whether management learns of an FRB objection 
only when it is publicly, and definitively, disclosed.  Under either of 
these scenarios, however, management will be confronted with two 
possible strategy types in the shadow of the threat of the FRB objection. 
To appreciate how this process unfolds, consider the choices 
facing management of a covered company that suspects the FRB might 
object to its plans (1) to pay a quarterly dividend of $0.75 to its 
stockholders and (2) to spin out (that is, distribute) an insurance 
division to its stockholders.  First, the company could simply reduce its 
 
 273  In the cases of Bank of America and Goldman Sachs, the mandates were 
provisional; once these banks revised their capital plan submissions, the FRB 
authorized their proposed distributions to stockholders.  See supra note 270 and 
accompanying text. 
 274  See supra notes 78–83 and accompanying text. 
WEBER (DO NOT DELETE) 10/24/2015  11:27 AM 
2015] COMPREHENSIVE CAPITAL ANALYSIS AND REVIEW  107 
planned dividend or scupper the planned spin out.  Although on the 
surface this course of action solves a procedural problem with the 
regulator, in practice it formally cements a more fundamental, 
economically substantive problem the company was trying to avoid: 
regulatory intervention with planned corporate actions and policies.  
Alternatively, the company could adjust its strategies with respect to 
non-dividend policies.  For example, the company might change its 
investment strategy by substituting low-risk loans for a portion of highly 
risky assets.275  Technically, this course of action would produce two 
computational effects, each of which would increase the company’s 
likelihood of passing the CCAR test.  First, it would lower the 
company’s “risk-weighted assets,” in the process decreasing the 
denominator of its capital adequacy ratio.276  In other words, it would 
be easier for the company to demonstrate higher capital ratios, thereby 
complying with regulatory minimum, because the equation’s 
denominator would have decreased.  Second, it would attenuate the 
adverse effects of the stress scenarios on the bank’s reconstructed, 
hypothetical balance sheet.  While this example imagines de-risking by 
asset substitution, the company would achieve similar alchemy by 
simply reducing total assets by borrowing less.  Therefore, a covered 
company can avoid an FRB objection of its planned distributions by 
decreasing the risk-weighted assets denominator through de-risking its 
asset portfolio. 
It is not possible to know exactly how the program, in practice, 
impacts managerial decision outcomes because covered companies are 
not required to disclose, and understandably choose not to volunteer, 
internal deliberations of this sort.  The experience of Goldman Sachs 
and Bank of America in 2014 is, however, instructive.  As noted earlier, 
the FRB preliminarily notified Goldman Sachs and Bank of America 
that the 2014 CCAR results would disclose their failure to maintain 
leverage ratios and (in Bank of America’s case) Tier 1 capital ratios 
above applicable regulatory minimums under the severely adverse 
scenario.277  The FRB permitted the two companies to submit adjusted 
capital plans.  The resubmitted plans were confidential, but the 
salience of the event resulted in significant media attention, and some 
 
 275  The following description explicates how the CCAR program carries forward 
the “risk tax” effect of capital requirements into the hypothetical, future-oriented 
realm of the informal-discretionary dimension.  See, e.g., Sun Bae Kim & Ramon 
Moreno, Stock Prices and Bank Lending Behavior in Japan, I ECON. REV. FED. RESERVE BANK 
S.F. 31, 3334 (1994) (noting that where the supply of equity finance is imperfectly 
elastic and temporal limitations for accumulating retained earnings as equity exist, an 
institution will likely be required to reduce its risk-weighted assets to maintain 
acceptable capital ratios). 
 276  See RICHARD S. CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 22632 
(2013) for a description of capital adequacy regulation that is both technical and 
concise. 
 277  See supra note 269 and accompanying text. 
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details emerged about the companies’ responses.  In its adjusted 
capital plan, Bank of America reduced its planned dividends, leaving 
it with more capital and a higher leverage ratio.278  Goldman Sachs, on 
the other hand, not only reduced its planned distributions, it also shed 
assets to boost its leverage ratio and reduce the risk of running into the 
same situation the following CCAR cycle.279  From the perspective of 
the FRB, the end results were similar: Bank of America became more 
resilient by retaining rather than distributing capital, and Goldman 
Sachs became more resilient by taking the further step of de-leveraging 
its balance sheet.  One of the more interesting trends to track in 
banking supervision is whether the FRB will continue this dialogic 
practice of providing preliminary results to banks whose capital plans 
come close, but not do not meet, the regulatory capital minimums 
under the severely adverse scenario.  No matter what the FRB does with 
respect to preliminary results, the threat of a CCAR capital plan 
rejection can be expected to alter the ex ante incentive structure for 
covered company management, thereby impacting beyond dividend 
policies to core matters of strategy and economic capital allocation. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Dividend restrictions have been a part of bank regulation in the 
United States since the Civil War when Congress enacted the National 
Bank Act, the first initial general incorporation statute for banks.  In 
today’s financial markets, these rigid, formulaic, accounting-based 
dividend restrictions (and their progeny) are anachronisms.  The 
endemic instability of today’s banking environment requires a 
different regulatory approach that considers how regulatory objectives 
can be promoted in an uncertain and volatile future.  But the 
regulation of dividends, if it can be implemented in an effective 
manner, remains a useful tool on account of its simplicity: by 
restricting the ability of banks and their holding companies to transfer 
capital to stockholders, they ensure that there is greater loss absorbing 
capital within the enterprise. 
With the DFAST stress tests and the CCAR program, the FRB and 
Congress should be applauded for having taken steps to do just that.  
These initiatives are noteworthy for two reasons.  The first reason is a 
matter of rationalist, regulatory technique.  Regulators have opted to 
update the anachronistic system in an effort to rehabilitate the logical 
connection between the regulatory means (dividend regulation) and 
the regulatory ends (a more resilient and stable banking system).  The 
 
 278  See Andrew Dunn, Bank of America to Increase its Dividend for First Time Since 
Financial Crisis, CHARLOTTE OBS., Mar. 26, 2014 (reporting that Bank of America “had 
to revise down the level of capital it would return to shareholders” in response to the 
FRB’s preliminary objection to its capital plan). 
 279  See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
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second reason matters from a regulatory theory perspective.  With its 
new CCAR program, the FRB unites the informal-discretionary and 
formal-mandatory dimensions of bank supervision.  Specifically, it has 
adopted the informal-discretionary element of imaginative and 
counterfactual thinking.  But by retaining a binary pass-fail mechanism 
calibrated to regulatory capital ratios, the CCAR program remains 
tethered to traditional formal-mandatory modes of regulation.  
Consequently, U.S. bank capital regulation has become a “risk 
regulatory” regime, a type of regulatory system that has prevailed for 
decades in other contexts such as environmental, health, and safety 
regulation.  This observation should prompt future research to inquire 
into how the traditional risk regulation literature sheds light on bank 
supervisory tasks, as well as how risk regulation in the financial 
supervision context might differ from the traditional contexts in which 
the risk regulatory model has taken hold.  Bearing in mind that one of 
the central purposes of financial institutions is to produce information 
about, purchase, and trade risk, this latter consideration opens a 
discussion about a new risk regulation of risk-taking, a theme that has 
not been examined. 
 
